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Case No. 20150460-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plain tiff!Appellee,
V.

LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from her conditional guilty plea to one count of
~

assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (West
2015). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(b)
(West 2009) (cases certified by court of appeals).

INTRODUCTION
Defendant intentionally kicked a corrections officer who had broken up a
fight between Defendant and another inmate. Relying on State v. Tiedemann,
Defendant moved to dismiss her charge of assault by a prisoner because the
prison lost the surveillance footage of her assault. Defendant claimed that the
footage would have shown that she was merely defending herself from the
other inmate when she kicked the officer. But the only evidence supporting

Defendant's version was the testimony of another inmate that the trial court
found to be incredible. That inmate was Defendant's fiance and the trial court
observed that Defendant had repeatedly signaled her with facial gestures as she
testified. The trial court denied Defendant's motion because Defendant did not
show a reasonable probability that the lost footage would have been
exculpatory. Alternatively, the court found that even if Defendant had made
such a showing, dismissal was inappropriate because the footage was only
negligently lost and Defendant had not proven prejudice.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
la. Did the trial court correctly interpret State v. Tiedemann to require that
a defendant who moves to dismiss based on the loss of evidence must first
show a reasonable probability that the lost evidence would have been
exculpatory?
1b. Alternatively, did the trial court correctly deny Defendant's motion
to dismiss after balancing the Tiedemann factors?

Standard of Review.

"Whether the State's destruction of potentially

exculpatory evidence violates due process is a question of law" reviewed "for
correctness." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if12, 162 P.3d 1106. This Court
reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error. Id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Constitution art. I,§ 7 states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 1

Defendant assaults another inmate and a prison guard
Corrections Officer Hansen was escorting inmates Samantha Dash and
Fatima Kahn back to their cells at the Utah State Prison's women's facility. RSS57. Defendant, Lisette Dejesus, shared cell 416 with Inmate Dash. R57,66. 2
Their cell was on the building's top tier to the right of the stairs as one faces the
cells. R66-67. Kahn's cell-415 - was adjacent to the right of Defendant's cell.
R62,66-67,70. To the left of Defendant's cell were cells 417 and 418 and then the
showers. R66.
Officer Hansen was following inmates Dash and Kahn up the stairs. R5758. He instructed Inmate Kahn to stand in front of her cell door, but Kahn
~

stopped in front of Defendant and Dash' s cell and began arguing with
Defendant. R58. At one point, Defendant exclaimed, "are we really gonna do
this in front of the cops[?]" R59. Meanwhile, Officer Hansen's partner opened

1

Because Defendant pled guilty, most of the factual statement comes
from the preliminary hearing transcript, a copy of which is in Addendum B.
2

Officer Hansen originally said that Defendant and Dash were in cell
415, R57, but clarified that they were actually in cell 416, R66,76.
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both cell doors before Hansen was ready and Inmate Dash distracted Officer
Hansen by exclaiming "Hansen[,] check this out." R58,76,67. Dash then pulled
open Defendant's cell door and Defendant emerged and attacked Kahn. R59,76.
Hansen pulled Defendant off of Kahn and carried Defendant back into
her cell. R59. But before he could pull the door closed, Defendant pushed past
him. R60,70. Hansen quickly pushed Defendant to the floor and off to the left
towards the showers. R60,70. 3
As Hansen again approached Defendant to subdue her, she looked him
"directly" in his eyes and kicked him twice, once in the lower abdomen, and
again in his right thigh. R60,71. At this point, Kahn was "a few feet" behind
Hansen. R60. She was not "anywhere near" him when Defendant kicked him.
R61.
About 15 to 30 minutes after the assault, Officer Hansen reviewed the
surveillance footage. R73;R175:2. He confirmed that it recorded the assault and
showed Kahn four to six feet behind him and "backing off" when Defendant
kicked him twice. R175:2-3.

3

Hansen testified on direct that when Defendant left her cell the second
time, she and Kahn "engaged again fighting" before he pushed Defendant to
the ground. R60. But he clarified on cross that Defendant did not reach Kahn
before he pushed her down. R70.
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The charge
The State charged Defendant with one count of assault by a prisoner,
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (West 2015), a third degree felony. Rl-2. The State
filed the information on 14 January 2014, a little over three and a-half months
after the assault. Rl-2. Defense counsel entered his appearance and filed a
~

general discovery request 13 days later, on 27 January 2014.

R6-12.

The

discovery request sought all video recordings prepared during the investigation
or prosecution of the case. R9. Two days later, on 29 January 2014, defense
counsel filed a supplemental discovery request seeking a "copy of any video of
the alleged incident."

R18.

Three months later, on 1 May 2014, the State

responded that it was "unable to provide any video of the incident as none exist
[sic] as per the Utah State Prison." R25.

Defendant moves to dismiss
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge under State v. Tiedemann, arguing
~

that the prison's loss of the surveillance footage violated her due process rights
under the state constitution. R37-44. She claimed that if she kicked Hansen, she
did so unintentionally while defending herself from Kahn. R38. The trial court
held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to allow the parties to introduce
evidence on the Tiedemann factors: whether the lost footage was reasonably
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likely to be exculpatory and if so, why it was lost, and the prejudice to
Defendant, if any. 4 R172;R175.
At that hearing, Officer Hansen explained that footage from the prison's
surveillance cameras is stored on a hard drive with a 30-day capacity. R175:78;R172:4-5,8. After 30 days, the oldest footage is automatically overwritten with
new footage. R175:7-8. Footage on the hard drive can be permanently saved by
copying it to a DVD. R175:8. Hansen was not authorized to save surveillance
footage; he understood that only his captain or the prison's investigations
division could do that.

R72;R175:10.

Hansen understood that if the

investigations division wanted a copy of surveillance footage, they had to ask
an employee in the prison's information technology division to save it. R175:10.

The prison investigator requests a copy of the
surveillance footage but it is negligently lost
The assault occurred on 27 September 2013.

R56.

Hansen quickly

reported the assault to his supervisor and filed a written report. R175:8. His
supervisor referred the matter to the prison's investigation division, and an
investigator interviewed Hansen "about an hour and a half after the incident."
R175:9.

4

The evidentiary hearing began on 2 December 2014; the trial court
heard additional evidence on 15 January 2015. Rll9,124;R175;Rl72. Copies of
these transcripts are in Addenda C and D respectively.
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Debbie Kemp, from the prison's investigations division, was the on-call
investigator that day.

R76;R172:1-2.

Her first act was to ask if there was

surveillance footage of the assault. R172:3. She was informed that there was,
and that someone in the control room had viewed it. R172:3,5. Kemp then
interviewed those involved and later returned to the control room to view the
footage, but the officer there was new and could not replay it. R172:3, 5. Kemp
asked that a copy of the footage be made because she was not authorized to
make one herself; only a captain or lieutenant captain could do that. R172:3,6-7.
Kemp could not recall the name of the officer that she asked to copy the footage;
her office was not in the prison and she was not familiar with every officer who
works there. R172:6,8. Kemp testified that the prison does not have a policy
regarding "playbacks of recordings made in the prison through the camera
system." R172:2.
When the assault occurred, the investigations division had an unusually
heavy workload because it was under extreme pressure to conduct background
investigations on applicants for corrections officer positions. R172:3-4. Under
normal conditions, an investigator would be assigned four or five background
investigations at a time and have eight weeks to complete each investigation.
R172:4. This load more than doubled in September 2014, with each investigator
being assigned to complete ten background investigations at a time within three
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weeks.

R172:4.

This unusually heavy load continued for "three or four

months" as the investigators worked to get caught up with all of the applicants.
R172:4.
That workload required prison investigators to put "[m]any things ... on
the back burner."

R172:4.

It hampered Investigator Kemp's follow-up

investigation and contributed to the delay in sending this case to the
prosecutor's office. R172:4.
Investigator Kemp could not recall when she followed up on the assault
investigation, but estimated that it may have been well beyond 30 days later
because her division was "still doing the background investigations." R172:7.
When Kemp asked for the copy of the surveillance footage, prison officers could
not produce one and they were uncertain whether one had even been made, or
whether it had been made and misplaced. R172:6,8.

Defendant provides no credible testimony
about what the footage would have shown
Defendant called Inmate Dash to testify about her recollection of the
events. R175:13. Dash asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to
testify. R175:15. As Dash asserted the privilege and then left the stand, the trial
court observed that "Defendant pulled faces and made facial expressions as if to
question what Dash had just done in open court." R131-32. The court was
11

II

uncertain," however, about the meaning of the interchange." R132.
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Defendant also called inmate Sarah Ataata at the evidentiary hearing.

R175:15. Ataata testified that she was in cell 417, which gave her a side view of
the altercation. R175:19-20,23. She testified that she saw Defendant, Hansen,
and Kahn all on the ground at the same time, that Kahn was behind Hansen
and swinging over him to get to Defendant, and that Kahn never backed off.
~

R175:17-19. Ataata never testified that Defendant did not kick Hansen or attack
Kahn. R175:15-27.
Ataata is Defendant's fiance. R175:26. During her testimony, the trial
court observed that Defendant made "facial gestures and expressions of
varying sorts to Ata[a]ta depending on what Ata[a]ta was saying in her
testimony." R132. The trial court rejected Ataata' s testimony as incredible for
three reasons: (1) her close relationship with Defendant; (2) Defendant's signals
to Ataata during her testimony; and (3) the fact that Ataata viewed the events
from an angle. R132,134.
Defendant did not testify. R172;R175.

Officer Hansen clarifies that the footage showed Kahn four
to six feet behind him when Defendant assaulted him
Officer Hansen initially described the assault in his testimony at
Defendant's preliminary hearing. RSS-73. At that hearing, defense counsel
i..iP

asked on cross about Kahn's location when Hansen pushed Defendant down
and to the left as she reemerged from her cell. R70. When defense counsel
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asked whether Kahn "was immediately to your right?" Hansen responded,
"Kahn ... she was on my back, I don't know exactly where she was. She was ...
she was not . . . she was no longer on my shoulder though, I could not see her
behind me, she was behind me." R70. When counsel asked "So she could've
been as close as inches away but you couldn't see her?" Hansen responded,
"But I could not see her, no." R70.
At the evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss, defense
counsel sought to clarify Hansen's preliminary hearing testimony.

R175:4.

Counsel reminded Hansen that he had earlier testified that Kahn was on his
back but that he did not know where she was. R175:4-5.
Hansen explained that he understood counsel's question at the
preliminary hearing to have asked about his knowledge of Kahn's location
while the altercation was ongoing, not based on what he saw in the surveillance
footage. R130;R175:5. Hansen clarified that although he did not know Kahn's
exact location behind him while the altercation was occurring, the surveillance
footage showed that she was four to six feet behind him when Defendant
kicked him.

R130;R175:5-7.

The trial court credited Hansen's explanation,

finding: "Hansen said when he told counsel on cross examination that he did
not know where Kalu1 was, that was based on what he knew at that time it was
transpiring, but viewing the recording made him aware Kahn was four to six
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feet behind him and was not engaging defendant when defendant kicked
Hansen." R130. The trial court also found that Hansen had "presented credible
evidence." R138.

The trial court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss
The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss because it
@

concluded that she had not satisfied the standard announced in State v.

Tiedemann. R132-136 (Addendum A is a copy of the trial court's ruling). The
trial court began by explaining that standard:

a defendant must first

demonstrate a '"reasonable probability' that lost or destroyed evidence would
be exculpatory." R133. If a defendant makes that showing, then the trial court
must balance two factors: (1) "the reason for the destruction or loss or failure of
preservation of the evidence, including the degree of negligence or culpability
on the part of the State," and (2) "the de[g]ree of prejudice to the defendant in
light of the materiality and importance of the missing evidence in the context of
@

the case as a whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence." R133.
The court noted that the "main principle is fundamental fairness." R133.
Applying this standard, the trial court found that Defendant had not
shown a reasonable probability that the lost surveillance footage would have
been exculpatory. R133-35. The court concluded that to "be reasonable ...
evidence must be believable." R134. But the only evidence that Defendant had
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produced to show that the footage would have been exculpatory was Ataata' s
testimony. R133. Because Ataata's "testimony was not believable," the trial
court concluded that it could not establish a reasonable probability that the
surveillance footage would have been exculpatory. R133-35.
The court recognized that Defendant's failure to satisfy Tiedemann's
threshold requirement provided sufficient reason to deny the motion. R135. It
nevertheless balanced the two Tiedemann factors. R135-38. Regarding the first
factor - the reason for the loss of the evidence and the degree of the State's
negligence or culpability-the court found that "the reasons given for the lack
of preservation are believable, and amount to negligence but not in a high
degree."

R137.

The court found "no culpable conduct by anyone in the

Department of Corrections." R137. It supported these findings with subsidiary
findings that:
•

Officer Hansen could not "cause the recording to be
preserved";

•

"The investigator ... asked the proper personnel to 'make [her]
a copy' of the event";

•

the footage "was not intentionally eliminated, or recorded
over," although "it clearly should have been retained";

•

"The nameless person who was asked to make a recording
perhaps, for any number of reasons, evidently failed to do so";

•

"The investigator, in the press of other business, failed to
follow up in a timely way";
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@

•

the failure to preserve a copy of the footage was "negligence,
but negligence born of a multitude of factors and the fact that
many personnel are involved in a setting such as a prison
control unit";

•

"The investigator should have ... conducted her investigation
in a way that retains relevant evidence";

•

the footage "was clearly relevant";

•

but the failure to preserve a copy of the footage "was at most
negligence, and not gross negligence and certainly not
intentional."

R137-38. Accordingly, the court concluded that "the reasons for the loss of the
evidence favor the State rather than dismissal of the charges." R138. The court
nevertheless expressed some frustration at the loss of the footage and
recognized that "[m]ore responsible conduct" by the prison would have
eliminated the need for this motion and the "attempt to 'divine' what the
recording showed." R136-37.
As for the second Tiedemann factor - prejudice to Defendant in light of the
materiality and importance of the missing evidence - the court found that
Defendant had not shown that she would suffer any prejudice from the loss of
the footage. R136. She had failed to do so because she did not produce any
credible evidence that the footage would show "in essence what defendant
claims."

R136.

Rather, Officer Hansen's testimony was the only credible

evidence recounting what occurred during the altercation. R138. Because no
credible evidence supported a finding that the footage would have been
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exculpatory, the court concluded that Defendant had failed to show any
prejudice. R136. The trial court therefore denied Defendant's motion. R132-38
(Add. A).

Defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal is denied
Defendant petitioned the court of appeals to review the trial court's
interlocutory order. R143. That court denied the petition. R144.

Defendant enters a conditional guilty plea
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of assault
by a prisoner, a third degree felony, reserving her right to appeal the denial of
her motion. RlS0-58. In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to recommend that
Defendant's sentence run concurrently with her other sentences. R153.

In

addition to the original charge that resulted in her incarceration, Defendant was
serving other consecutive sentences based on her conduct while incarcerated.
R173:7.

Defendant receives a concurrent prison sentence
The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve zero to five years in prison,
to run concurrently with her other sentences.

R157-58.

Defendant timely

appealed and the court of appeals certified the case to this Court. 5 R159.

5

State v. Mohamud, 20140844-SC, which the court of appeals also certified
to this Court, also involves the denial of a motion to dismiss under State v.
Tiedemann.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to
dismiss based on the lost surveillance footage because it misinterpreted State v.
~

Tiedemann.

She first argues that the trial court erroneoµ$ly interpreted

Tiedemann to require her to make a threshold showing of a reasonable
~

probability that the lost footage would have been exculpatory. She asserts that
regardless of the nature of the footage, the trial court was required to balance
the four factors that apply to an alleged discovery violation under rule 16, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to resolve her motion. She contends that analysis
of these factors requires dismissal.

Alternatively, she argues that she was

entitled to dismissal under the trial court's reading of Tiedemann because she
demonstrated a reasonable probability that the lost footage would have been
exculpatory, and also showed that the reasons for the loss and the resulting
prejudice to her required dismissal.
The trial court correctly interpreted and applied Tiedemann.

The trial

court's conclusion that Tiedemann requires a threshold showing is consistent
with Tiedemann's language and structure, especially where the Vermont test that

Tiedemann used as a model imposed the same threshold requirement. This
requirement ensures that the due process analysis remains true to its
touchstone - fundamental fairness.

The loss of evidence can result in a
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fundamental unfairness only when there is a reasonable probability that the
evidence would have been exculpatory. Requiring a trial court to engage in a
balancing test when the lost evidence would have been inculpatory or
irrelevant would be pointless. Other states require a similar threshold showing.
The trial court's interpretation was also consistent with both the court of
appeals' interpretation of Tiedemann and defense counsel's reading of Tiedemann
in his initial memorandum supporting the motion to dismiss.
Although the Tiedemann court mentioned the rule 16 factors, it did not coopt them as the test for lost evidence claims. Those factors were designed to
analyze a different problem: what to do when the prosecution does not disclose
existing inculpatory evidence that it intends to introduce at trial. The Tiedemann
court recognized that while the multi-factored balancing approach for
analyzing rule 16 claims is helpful in analyzing lost evidence claims, the specific
factors themselves are not.

Instead, the Tiedemann court took the basic

principles found in rule 16's approach and incorporated them into the two
factors that a trial court must balance if a defendant can first show a reasonable
probability that the lost evidence would have been exculpatory: (1) the reason
the evidence was lost, including the degree of the State's culpability or
negligence; and (2) the resulting prejudice to the defendant in light of the
importance of the evidence.

-16-

The trial court correctly found that Defendant did not satisfy Tiedemann's
threshold requirement or its balancing test. Defendant produced no credible
evidence that the lost footage would have supported her version of the events.
She therefore failed to show a reasonable probability that the lost footage would
have been exculpatory.
Although the trial court recognized that this was reason enough to deny
the motion, it nevertheless considered Tiedemann' s two factors and correctly
found that neither weighed in favor of dismissal. Prison officials were, at worst,
only negligent in failing to preserve the footage. The prison investigator asked
for a copy of the footage, but never received it and did not timely follow up due
to the press of other business. Defendant also failed to show that she suffered
any prejudice because all of the credible evidence showed that the video would
have conclusively proven her guilt. Thus, the only party prejudiced by the loss
of the footage was the State.

If the trial court was required to analyze the rule 16 factors, this Court
should remand for the trial court to do so, rather than analyzing those factors in
the first instance.

Alternatively, none of those factors weigh in favor of

dismissal. First, the prosecutor did not misrepresent the existing evidence.
Second, Defendant's claim that she was prejudiced by the loss of the footage is
based on the unsupported presumption that it would have supported her
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version of the events. All of the credible evidence demonstrated otherwise.
Third, the trial court correctly found that the State was merely negligent in
losing the footage.

Finally, while it is undisputed that Defendant's own

investigation could not have preserved the lost footage, that factor is unhelpful
to a lost evidence analysis because it will always be satisfied when the State
loses evidence.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED
APPLIED STATE V. TIEDEMANN

AND

In State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106, this Court established the
test for determining when the State's loss or destruction of evidence in a
criminal prosecution violates a defendant's due process rights under the Utah
Constitution. As explained below, the trial court here correctly interpreted

Tiedemann to require a defendant to first establish "a reasonable probability that
lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory." Id. ,I44. If a defendant does
so, a trial court must then balance two factors: (1) the State's culpability in
losing the evidence; and (2) the degree of prejudice to the defendant. Id.
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted Tiedemann
to require a threshold showing. Br.Aplt. 15-16. Instead, Defendant argues that

Tiedemann requires a trial court to balance the four factors that this Court has
identified for analyzing an alleged discovery violation under rule 16, Utah

-18-

Rules of Criminal Procedure, "regardless of whether a defendant can
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence would be
exculpatory." Br.Aplt. 16-17. Defendant argues that she is entitled to dismissal
under a balancing of these factors. Br .Apit. 23-32. Alternatively, she argues
that she was entitled to dismissal under the trial court's interpretation of
'@

Tiedemann.

Br.Aplt. 32-49. She asserts that she demonstrated a reasonable

probability that the lost footage would have been exculpatory, and that the
reasons for the footage's loss, and the resulting prejudice to her, required
dismissal. Br.Aplt. 32-49.
A. Tiedemann requires a threshold showing that the lost evidence
was reasonably likely to be exculpatory.

In Tiedemann, this Court considered whether the State's destruction of
evidence from a murder investigation violated the defendant's rights under
Utah's Due Process Clause. 2007 UT 49, ifif30-31, 39, 44. Tiedemann was
charged with murdering three people in 1991. Id.if2. The State dismissed the
charges after he was committed to the Utah State Hospital because he was
incompetent and unlikely to ever be restored to competency. Id. if 7. Two years
later, following standard policy, the state evidence custodian destroyed some of
the physical evidence from the case. Id. if 8.
Over eight years after the evidence was destroyed, the prosecutor refiled
the murder charges after learning that Tiedemann was about to be released
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from the Utah State Hospital. Id. ifl0. Tiedemann moved to dismiss the refiled
charges, arguing that the State's destruction of evidence violated his rights
under Utah's Due Process Clause. Id.

,r,r10, 31, 33.

The trial court denied the

motion. Id. if10.

1. The Tiedemann test.
In resolving Tiedemann' s interlocutory appeal, this Court considered
whether to adopt under the Utah Constitution, the United States Supreme
Court's analysis for determining whether the prosecution's loss or destruction
of evidence violates the Federal Due Process Clause. Id.

if if39, 44.

The Supreme

Court held in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), that when the most
that could be said about the lost evidence is that it was "potentially useful," a
defendant must "show bad faith on the part of the police" to establish a federal
due process violation. The Tiedemann court refused to adopt Youngblood's test
because it viewed the test as '"both too broad and too narrow."' 2007 UT 49,

if 44.
In formulating an analysis for lost evidence claims, the Tiedemann court
reviewed how alleged discovery violations under rule 16, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, are analyzed. Id. if41. When a defendant claims that the
prosecution violated rule 16 by not disclosing evidence that it intends to
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introduce at trial, four "nonexclusive factors" guide a trial court's evaluation of
a motion to exclude the undisclosed evidence:
(1) the extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the
existing evidence] is actually inaccurate,
(2) the tendency of the omission or misstatement to lead defense
counsel into tactics or strategy that could prejudice the outcome,
(3) the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting pertinent
information or misstating the facts, and
(4) the extent to which appropriate defense investigation would
have discovered the omitted or misstated evidence.

Id. (quoting State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994)) (alteration in
original). The Court observed that the "culpability or pad faith of the state" is
only one consideration in the rule 16 analysis. Id. The Tiedemann court then
stated that the rule 16 factors are "relevant" to a motion to dismiss based on lost
evidence and that this balancing "approach ... should govern" such claims. Id.
The Tiedemann court then noted its agreement with Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion in Youngblood.

Id. ,142.

Although he concurred in

Youngblood's result, Justice Stevens believed that its rule was "much broader
than necessary." 488 U.S. at 60 (Stevens, J., concurring). He was concerned that
there might be cases where a defendant could not prove bad faith, but where
the loss of evidence was "nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a
criminal trial fundamentally unfair." Id. He also observed that it was unlikely
that Youngblood suffered prejudice because:
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(1) his trial counsel had

emphasized that testing of the lost DNA evidence in that case might have
exonerated Youngblood; and (2) the jury was instructed that if it found that the
state had lost relevant evidence it could '"infer that the true fact is against the
State's interest."' Id. at 59-60. Finally, Justice Stevens noted that, "even without
the prophylactic sanction" of dismissal, the state "has a strong incentive to
preserve" evidence whose true character cannot be discerned absent testing,
because the state bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 59.
The Tiedemann court then observed that eight other states had agreed
with Justice Steven's concurrence that Youngblood's test was too broad. 2007 UT
49, if42. In interpreting their due process clauses, those states had rejected the

Youngblood analysis in favor of a balancing test in which police bad faith was
only one consideration. Id.
The Tiedemann court highlighted the Vermont Supreme Court's analysis,
which requires a defendant to make the threshold showing of '"a reasonable
possibility that the lost evidence would be exculpatory."' Id. if43 (quoting State
v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994)).

If a defendant can cross that

threshold, a Vermont court must then balance three factors: "'(1) the degree of
negligence or bad faith on the part of the government; (2) the importance of the
evidence lost; and (3) other evidence of guilt adduced at trial."' Id.
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(ii)

Like the Vermont court, the Tiedemann court concluded "that some
balancing of factors on a case-by-case basis is required." Id. ,r44. This Court
explained that the balancing "should embrace the basic principles" previously
"adopted under rule 16 and the factors mentioned by other states." Id.
The Tiedemann court then announced the Utah test which, as explained,
~

requires a trial court to balance the State's culpability in losing the evidence and
the prejudice to the defendant, provided the defendant can first show a
reasonable probability that the lost evidence would be exculpatory. Id. The
Court stated:
In cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that
lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, we find it
necessary to require consideration of the following: (1) the reason
for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the degree of
negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the degree
of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and
importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a
whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence.

Id.
The Tiedemann court emphasized that "fundamental fairness" is the
"touchstone" for the "balancing process." Id. ,r45. Thus, the State's behavior
might be "so reprehensible" that a sanction would be required even where the
prejudice was "slight or only speculative." Id. Conversely, where prejudice "is
extreme" a sanction might be required despite a lack of any wrongdoing by the
State. Id. The Court remanded the case to allow the trial court to apply this
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newly-announced test. Id. ,I46. The Court directed the trial court to weigh the

<;>

two factors identified in paragraph 44, not the previously mentioned rule 16
factors. See id.
2. Requiring a threshold showing is consistent with
Tiedemann's language and structure, the intent of the Due
Process Clause, and other states' approaches.

Defendant argues that Tiedemann, and the cases it relied on, reject the
requirement of a threshold showing. Br.Aplt. 16-24. Defendant misreads both

Tiedemann and the authority that it relied on.
While some language in Tiedemann appears to support Defendant's
reading, closer analysis reveals that the opinion requires a defendant to make a
threshold showing of a reasonable probability that lost evidence would be
exculpatory before courts must engage in the balancing test. Indeed, this is how
defense counsel here originally interpreted Tiedemann. R174:3. Counsel initially
11

concede[d] that there has to be some reasonable probability that [the lost

footage] would present some exculpatory evidence," Rl74:3, but later filed a
supplemental memorandum arguing that Tiedemann requires no threshold
showing, R93-100. In accord with counsel's initial interpretation, however, the
court of appeals has also consistently interpreted Tiedemann to require a
threshold showing, as explained below. See State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328,

ifiJ 19-22, 243 P.3d 902; State v. Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58, if24,322 P.3d 746. This
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reading is consistent with the overall language and structure of the Tiedemann
opinion, the intent of Utah's Due Process Clause, and the approach that other
state courts have taken under their state constitutions.
a. Tiedemann's language and structure.

In introducing the Tiedemann test, the Court stated that "some balancing
of factors on a case-by-case basis is required." 2007 UT 49, ,r44. But the Court
spoke only in general terms of considerations that the new balancing test
"should embrace." Id. Those general considerations were "the basic principles"
that the Court had adopted under a rule 16 analysis, and the factors that other
states had "mentioned." Id.
But read in context, this general language does not r~quire a trial court to
engage in a balancing test whenever a defendant claims that any piece of
evidence has been lost. Although this introductory language establishes that a
multi-factored balancing test will generally apply, it does not detail the specific
factors that compose that test or the circumstances under which that test will
apply. See id. Rather, that specific direction comes later.
Although the Court did specifically mention the rule 16 analysis, it spoke
only in terms of "the basic principles" -not the specific factors-that underlie
that analysis.

Id.

And for good reason- the rule 16 factors do not lend

themselves to wholesale incorporation into a lost evidence analysis. Rather,
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they were designed to address a different problem: whether the prosecution
has ambushed a defendant by failing to disclose existing inculpatory evidence
that it intends to introduce at trial. See id. ,I41 (quoting Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143).
For example, the first two rule 16 factors examine: (1) '"the extent to which the
prosecution's representation [of the existing evidence] is actually inaccurate"';
and (2) "' the tendency of the omission or misstatement to lead defense counsel
into tactics or strategy that could prejudice the outcome."' Id. (alteration in
original). But whether a defendant has had notice of and a fair opportunity to
address the prosecution's inculpatory evidence says nothing about how the loss
of potentially exculpatory evidence will impact her.
The fourth rule 16 factor-whether the defendant could have discovered
the undisclosed evidence through her own efforts - is likewise irrelevant to a
due process claim based on lost or destroyed evidence. The likelihood that a
defendant could have discovered evidence before the State lost or destroyed it
is relevant only to whether the defendant could have avoided a Tiedemann claim
altogether, not what due process requires now that the evidence is gone.
Whether a defendant could have discovered undisclosed, but existing evidence,
bears on whether she could have been prepared to address that undisclosed
evidence at trial, and therefore whether it would be fundamentally unfair to
allow the prosecution to introduce it. But the possibility that a defendant might
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have been able to discover the evidence herself will not change the fact that the
State ultimately lost the evidence.

The fourth rule 16 factor is therefore

unhelpful in evaluating a lost evidence claim.
The third rule 16 factor-"'the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting
pertinent information or misstating the facts'" -is relevant to a lost evidence
claim, but only if framed in terms of the prosecutor's culpability in losing,
rather than misstating, the evidence. See id. if41 (quoting Kallin, 877 P.2d at
143).

Recognizing this, the Court incorporated an analysis of the State's

responsibility for the loss of the evidence into the first Tiedemann factor. See id.
if44. Thus, rather than simply co-opting the rule 16 factors as the due process
analysis for lost evidence claims, the Tiedemann court's analysis shows that it
incorporated "the basic principles" of those factors -the prosecutor's
culpability and the prejudice to the defendant- as the balancing test, provided
that a defendant can satisfy the threshold showing. See id. if 44. Tellingly, when
the Tiedemann court remanded that case for the trial court to apply the new due
process balancing test, it directed the trial court to consider the two factors
identified in paragraph 44, not the rule 16 factors the Court had previously
mentioned. See id. if 46.
The Tiedemann court's highlighting of the Vermont test further supports
the conclusion that Tiedemann adopted a threshold requirement as part of the
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Utah test. As mentioned, the Tiedemann court detailed the Vermont test in the
paragraph immediately preceding its announcement of the newly-adopted
Utah test. Id. ,r43. The Vermont test plainly requires a threshold showing of "'a
reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be exculpatory."'

Id.

(quoting Delisle, 648 A.2d at 642-43). It is difficult to believe that the Court
would highlight a test that contains a threshold requirement and then, without
any explanation or analysis, adopt a test that omits that requirement. Id. Thus,
the more cohesive reading of Tiedemann is that the Court highlighted the
Vermont test as a model for the Utah test announced in the next paragraph.
Paragraph 44 outlines the Utah test.

See id. ,r44.

That paragraph's

opening sentences explain that the Court agreed with the Vermont approach
and therefore a multi-factor balancing test would now govern lost evidence
claims. See id.
The final sentence of Tiedemann's paragraph 44 then announces the Utah
test. See id. As stated, that sentence begins with the threshold requirement that
is part of the Vermont test:

In cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, we find it necessary to
require consideration of the following: (1) the reason for the
destruction or loss of the evidence, including the degree of
negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the degree
of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and
importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a
whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence.
-28-
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Id. (emphasis added).
Two characteristics of this sentence show that the Tiedemann court
intended it to establish the governing test. First, as mentioned, it incorporates
the threshold requirement from the Vermont test that the Court had just
highlighted.

Second, it details the specific factors that Utah courts must

balance. Those factors "embrace the basic principles" of the rule 16 factors and
"the factors mentioned by other states": the State's level of culpability, the
importance of the evidence, and the potential impact of its loss on a defendant.

See id.
Defendant's attempt to find the applicable test elsewhere in Tiedemann is
illogical. If the opening sentences of paragraph 44 establish a general balancing
test that applies to any lost evidence claim-without any threshold showing of
a reasonable likelihood that the evidence would be exculpatory-then
defendants who can make that threshold showing would have a higher burden
than those who cannot. Under Defendant's reading, a defendant who claims
that the State lost some evidence, regardless of its nature, can obtain relief based
on a balancing of the rule 16 factors.

But defendants who can show a

reasonable probability that the lost evidence would have been exculpatory must
demonstrate not only that the rule 16 factors weigh in favor of dismissal, but
that "two additional factors" do as well. Br.Aplt. 32. The Tiedemann court could
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not have intended to make relief more difficult to obtain for defendants who
could show that lost evidence was reasonably likely to be exculpatory, than for
defendants who could not make that showing.
Defendant argues in a footnote that the two Tiedemann factors in
paragraph 44 "seem[] aimed more towards the consequences of the due process
violation rather than whether a due process violation occurred. Br.Aplt. 33 n.5.
But Tiedemann discussed only one remedy for the alleged due process
violation- dismissal of the prosecution. See Tiedemann 2007 UT 49,

,r,r10, 30, 41.

Tiedemann assumed that if a due process violation occurred, dismissal was
required. See id. Thus, the test outlined in paragraph 44 determines whether a
due process violation has occurred, not what remedy to apply. Id. if44.
In sum, although some isolated portions of Tiedemann appear to support

t-.',

'<:I

Defendant's reading, a more cohesive reading supports the conclusion that

Tiedemann requires a threshold showing.
b. Fundamental fairness does not guarantee access to all
evidence regardless of its nature.

Defendant argues that requiring a threshold showing of a reasonable
probability that the evidence would have been exculpatory undermines
fundamental fairness. Br.Aplt. 21. On the contrary, the fact that due process is
grounded in fundamental fairness reinforces the conclusion that Tiedemann
requires this threshold showing.
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Defining the requirements of due process with precision is difficult, if not
impossible.

See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Seros., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). The

difficulty arises because due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed
ti,

content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and requires
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." In re Baby

(@

Girl T., 2012 UT 78, ,16, 298 P.3d 1251 (quotation and citation omitted).
In the context of a defendant's access to evidence, due process does not
require that a defendant have access to every scrap of evidence, regardless of its
nature. Rather, due process requires access only to material evidence. See State

v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ,39, 979 P.2d 799 (holding that no due process violation
occurred where undisclosed evidence was not" constitutionally material").
For example, when a defendant shows that the prosecution failed to
disclose existing evidence, a due process violation occurs only if the defendant
can also show that the undisclosed evidence "is material to guilt or to
@

punishment." State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1304-05 (Utah 1986) (citing Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). To be "material in the constitutional sense,"

the evidence must be "'vital to the issues of whether the defendant is guilty of
the charge."' Id. at 1305 (quoting State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985)).
"'The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped
the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial does not establish
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materiality" in the constitutional sense."' Id. (quoting Lovato, 702 P.2d at 106)

(emphasis in original).
But even when constitutionally material evidence goes undisclosed, due
process entitles the defendant only to disclosure of that evidence and a retrial,
not a dismissal. Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, ,r94, 128 P.3d 1123 (Brady violation
1

entitled defendant to capital resentencing). Indeed, dismissal is a ' harsh" and
"drastic remedy." Bonneville Tower Condo. Mgmt. Comm. v. Thompson Michie

Assocs., Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). Dismissal should be appropriate
"only when no other sanction would reach a fair result." People v. Roan, 685
P.2d 1369, 1371 (Colo. 1984) (destruction of defendant's blood samples in
vehicular homicide prosecution did not require dismissal).
Likewise, when a defendant claims that pre-indictment delay made it
difficult or impossible for him to access favorable evidence, he must show
'' actual prejudice" to demonstrate a due process violation. State v. Hales, 2007
UT 14, ,r 49-55, 152 P .3d 321. This requires a showing of something more than
mere "speculation" that the delay resulted in a loss of favorable evidence. Id.
,r51.
And when a defendant claims that the government's refusal to reveal an
informant's identity denies him access to necessary evidence, a due process
II

violation occurs only if the defendant makes some showing that disclosure of
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an informant's identity is material and essential to his defense." State v. Nielsen,
727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986). Again, a defendant's inability to access evidence
that might be merely helpful is insufficient to show a due process violation. See

id.
The Tiedemann court recognized that "fundamental fairness" is the
"touchstone" for analyzing whether a loss of evidence violates Utah's Due
Process Clause.

2007 UT 49, ,I44-45.

A trial has the potential to be

fundamentally unfair only if lost evidence is exculpatory, or at least has a
reasonable probability to be so.

If the State loses neutral or inculpatory

evidence, there is nothing fundamentally unfair about requiring a defendant to
stand trial. Such a loss has no effect, or only a beneficial one, for that defendant.
When there is no way to discern the actual content and character of lost
evidence, then its potential to exculpate will always equal its potential to
inculpate. But, as stated, a loss of evidence can be fundamentally unfair to a
defendant only if there is at least a reasonable probability that the evidence
would have been exculpatory. This threshold showing therefore grounds the

Tiedemann test in the principles that Utah's Due Process Clause protects.
Defendant argues that because the prosecution is already required to
preserve and disclose evidence that "may be exculpatory," requiring
defendants "to establish that the evidence was exculpatory in order to consider
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whether state due process was violated by the destruction of the evidence"
"add[s] nothing to the analysis." Br.Aplt. 22. But as the above due process
cases demonstrate, it is not enough to show that evidence might have been
@

exculpatory.

To invoke constitutional considerations, the evidence must

possess more than the mere possibility that it might have helped the defendant
or affected the outcome. See Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1305. The threshold showing is
therefore a necessary prerequisite to invoking constitutional protection.
Moreover, contrary to Defendant's suggestion, Tiedemann does not
require a defendant to" establish that the evidence was exculpatory." Br.Aplt. 22
(emphasis added).

Rather, as explained, she need show only a "reasonable

probability" that the lost evidence "would be exculpatory." Tiedemann, 2007 UT
49, if44 (emphasis added). Without that showing, there is no way to conclude
that her trial would be fundamentally unfair. Requiring a defendant to stand
trial even though the prosecution has lost some of its inculpatory evidence
would only benefit a defendant.

c.

Other states require a threshold showing.

For this reason, other states that do not follow the Youngblood analysis
require the same threshold showing. Defendant argues that other states that
have abandoned the Youngblood test under their state constitutions "do not
require a threshold showing of a reasonable probability that the evidence
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would be exculpatory."

Br.Aplt. 17.

She sites to cases from Alaska,

Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia.
Br.Aplt. 17-18. Defendant argues that these states provide for a due process
@

balancing "when the destroyed evidence is only 'potentially exculpatory."'
Br.Aplt. 18. But a requirement that the evidence be "potentially exculpatory" is

@

nevertheless a threshold showing that a defendant must satisfy to obtain a
balancing test, even if it is less stringent than a requirement to show a
"reasonable probability" that the evidence would be exculpatory. Again, it
makes no sense to engage in a due process balancing test when the best that can
be said about the evidence is that its potential to exculpate is equal to its
potential to inculpate.
More importantly, Defendant is wrong that Massachusetts and Vermont
do not require a threshold showing to trigger due process balancing. On the
contrary, and as already explained, Vermont requires a defendant to first show

@

"'a reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be exculpatory."' State v.

Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994).
Defendant appears to base her argument that Vermont does not impose a
threshold showing on the fact that the Delisle court required only a "reasonable

possibility" that the lost evidence would be exculpatory. Br.Aplt. 18 (quoting
Delisle, 648 A.2d at 642-43) (Defendant's emphasis). True, demonstrating that a
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"reasonable possibility" exists may be easier than demonstrating that a
"reasonable probability" exists. But lowering a hurdle does not remove the
hurdle altogether. By requiring defendants to show a "reasonable possibility
that the lost evidence would be exculpatory" before a court must engage in a
balancing test, the Vermont court necessarily required that a defendant satisfy
that threshold showing before obtaining a balancing analysis. Delisle, 648 A.2d
at 642-43 (emphasis added).
Likewise, contrary to Defendant's representation, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court has explained that "it makes sense" to require a defendant to
"bear the initial burden of demonstrating the exculpatory nature" of the
evidence he claims the prosecution has lost. Commonwealth v. Williams, 919
N.E.2d 685, 694 (Mass. 2010). Massachusetts has crafted a balancing test similar
to

the

one that

the

Tiedemann court announced:

weighing "the

Commonwealth's culpability, the materiality of the evidence, and the prejudice
to the defendant." Id. at 695. But a Massachusetts court must balance these
factors only if a defendant meets the "threshold burden" of showing "' a
reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile
imagination,"' that the lost evidence would have been exculpatory. Id. at 693-94

(quoting Comnwnwealth v. Neal, 464 N.E.2d 1356, 1364 (Mass. 1984)).

©
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Defendant cites Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496 (Mass. 1991),
to support her claim that Massachusetts does not impose a threshold
requirement. Br.Aplt. 18. Defendant is mistaken. Besides predating Williams,

Henderson explicitly recognizes that the defendant had demonstrated "the
reasonable possibility" that the lost evidence in his case would have been
exculpatory. 582 N.E.2d at 497.
Henderson was charged with robbery after the victim, who was then
serving as a juror in a different case where Henderson was the defendant,
claimed to recognize him as her robber. Id. at 497. The identification happened
more than two years after the robbery. Id. The trial court granted Henderson's
motion to dismiss because the police had lost the written description of the
assailant that the victim had provided when the crime occurred. Id. at 496-97.
The Henderson court never detailed the Massachusetts test for evaluating
lost evidence claims in its brief, seven-paragraph opinion. Id. at 496-97. But it
did note that the trial court had explicitly found that Henderson had
demonstrated "the reasonable possibility" that the lost description "could have
been used to impeach the identifying witness."

Id.

Henderson therefore

supports the conclusion that Massachusetts does require a threshold showing
for lost evidence claims.

But even if Henderson did not, the Massachusetts

Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Williams unambiguously states that a
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defendant who moves for dismissal based on the state's loss of evidence must
"bear the initial burden of demonstrating the exculpatory nature" of the lost
evidence. 919 N.E.2d at 694.
Like Vermont, Massachusetts, and Utah, New Mexico also requires a
defendant to make a threshold showing. State v. Riggs, 838 P.2d 975, 978 (N.M.
1992). Under Riggs, a defendant must show that the lost evidence II is in some
way determinative of guilt" before a defendant can show a due process
violation. Id. Tiedemann's threshold requirement is therefore consistent with
these states' approaches.
Defendant argues that she should not be required to make a threshold
showing because it is difficult to do so when the evidence no longer exists.
Br.Aplt. 18-19.

She cites Delisle from Vermont, and cases from Alaska,

Connecticut, and Delaware, as recognizing this difficulty. Br.Aplt. at 19. But as
explained, despite this acknowledged difficulty, the Delisle court nevertheless
required Vermont defendants to make a threshold showing. See 648 A.2d at
642-43.
A threshold requirement does not undermine due process. Due process
requires that a defendant be treated fairly, not that she be excused from ever
bearing any difficult burden.

As the United States Supre1ne Court has

recognized, the Federal Due Process Clause does not require an "ideal" system
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that guards "against every possible hardship that may befall." Ownbey v.

Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110 (1921).
Moreover, Tiedemann's "reasonable probability" standard accounts for the
difficulty of establishing the actual nature of lost evidence. Tiedemann requires
that a defendant show only a "reasonable probability" that the evidence would
be exculpatory, not that it in fact would be. See 2007 UT 49, 144.
This would not have been difficult to do in this case had there been
credible evidence to support Defendant's claim that the footage would have
supported her version of the events. Defendant could have used testimony
from other inmates, prison officers, or even herself to satisfy Tiedemann's
threshold showing. Defendant's difficulty arose not from the nature of the
threshold showing, but from the fact that no credible evidence supported her
version of the events.
Defendant argues that a threshold "reasonable probability" requirement
~

encourages destruction of evidence because the evidence then becomes only
'"potentially useful."' Br.Aplt. 21. (quoting Thorne v. Dep't. of Pub. Safety, 774
P.2d 1326, 1331 n.9 (Alaska 1989)).

But the State "has strong incentive to

preserve the evidence" because it bears the burden of proof and it risks
dismissal whenever critical evidence is lost. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,
59 (Stevens,

J., concurring).

Moreover, Tiedemann requires a trial court to
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examine the reasons for the loss or destruction of evidence, including the State's
culpability. See 2007 UT 49, if 44. That factor would weigh heavily in favor of
dismissal if a State agent were to intentionally destroy evidence that was
reasonably likely to be exculpatory.
Thus, a threshold showing is consistent with Tiedemann's language and
structure, the due process focus on fundamental fairness, and other states'
approaches.
3. The court of appeals' interpretation of Tiedemann has been
consistent.

Defendant argues that the Utah Court of Appeals has been inconsistent in
interpreting whether Tiedemann requires a threshold showing. Br.Aplt. 14-15 &
n.1. She contends that in State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328,

,r,r10, 19-21,

243

P.3d 902, the court of appeals "simply balanced the factors as required by

Tiedemann" without requiring a threshold showing, but later "misinterpreted
Tiedemann to require a threshold showing" in State v. Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58,

if 24,322 P.2d 746. Br.Aplt. 14-15 & n.1. Defendant misreads Jackson.
Jackson hit his estranged girlfriend with his car, then backed up and
appeared to be maneuvering to hit her again. 2010 UT App. 328,

if 2. The

victim's son, who was accompanied by his pit bull dog, gave the dog to his
mother and tried to stop Jackson by opening the front passenger door of
Jackson's car and trying to hit him. Id. Jackson pulled a knife and cut and
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stabbed the son and, as the son retreated, continued to chase and stab him. Id.

13.

On seeing this, the victim released the pit bull, which chased Jackson. Id.

Jackson stabbed the dog in the throat, attacked the victim again, and fled. Id.
Before trial, the State released Jackson's car to the lienholder, who cleaned
and sold it before Jackson could examine it. Id.
~

15.

Jackson moved to dismiss,

arguing that he intended to argue self-defense and that the State had violated
his due process rights by allowing evidence "crucial" to that theory to be
destroyed. Id. Jackson argued that he could have shown that there was canine
blood in the car, which "would have corroborated his claim that the pit bull
attacked him." Id. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and Jackson
appealed. Id. 115, 19.
In explaining the Tiedemann test, the court of appeals first stated that
"courts should consider the 'nonexclusive factors' outlined in rule 16 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Id. 120 (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,

viJ

141). The court also quoted those factors. Id. The court of appeals then stated:

"Additionally, if a defendant establishes 'a reasonable probability that lost or
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory,' courts also need to consider" (1) the
State's culpability for the loss and (2) the prejudice to the defendant.
(quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 144).
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Id.

Defendant reads Jackson as requiring a balancing of the rule 16 factors
whenever a defendant asserts a lost evidence claim under Tiedemann, regardless
of the nature of the evidence. Br.Aplt. 15 n.1. But that is not what Jackson held.
Granted, the court of appeals did not explicitly analyze whether Jackson
had satisfied Tiedemann's threshold requirement by showing that the lost blood
evidence was reasonably likely to be exculpatory. But the court did not excuse
Jackson from that requirement. Rather, it assumed that Jackson had made that
threshold showing. See Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, 1iJ5, 20-21.
The court of appeals set the stage for its analysis by acknowledging
Jackson's argument that the blood evidence in the car "was crucial to his selfdefense theory." Id. ,IS. The court further explained that Jackson had claimed
"that the car may have contained some of the pit bull's blood, which blood
allegedly would have supported his self-defense theory by potentially
establishing that the son and pit bull attacked first." Id. ,f21.
The court then limited its analysis to the two factors that a court must
analyze only after a defendant has satisfied the threshold showing. Id. ,I,r21-22.
The court of appeals never analyzed the rule 16 factors. Id.
The court of appeals' analysis therefore assumed that Jackson had made a
threshold showing of a reasonable probability that the lost blood evidence
would be exculpatory, and then limited its analysis accordingly. See id. ,I,rS, 21-
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22. Jackson is therefore consistent with the court of appeals' later explanation of

Tiedemann in Otkovic, where the court held that to prevail on a motion to
dismiss based on lost evidence, "a defendant must first demonstrate as a
@

threshold matter, that there is 'a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed
evidence would be exculpatory."' 2014 UT App 58, 124.
B. The trial court correctly concluded that Tiedemann did not
require dismissal.
Defendant argues that she is entitled to dismissal under Tiedemann.

@

Br.Aplt. 23. She first argues that the rule 16 factors-which the trial court did
not analyze, but should have under her reading of Tiedemann-weigh in favor
of dismissal. Br.Aplt. 24-32. Defendant alternatively argues that, contrary to
the trial court's ruling, she satisfied Tiedemann's threshold requirement to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the lost footage would have been
exculpatory, and further demonstrated that a balancing of (1) the reasons for
the loss, and (2) the prejudice to her, required dismissal. Br.Aplt. 32-49.
1. The trial court correctly concluded that Defendant had not
satisfied Tiedemann's threshold showing.
The trial court correctly concluded that Defendant had not satisfied

Tiedemann's threshold requirement because she produced no credible evidence
of a reasonable probability that the lost surveillance footage would have been
exculpatory.

R134-35 (Add. A).

A reasonable probability that a particular

-43-

circumstance exists cannot rest on evidence that is not credible. See State v.

Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ifif24, 36-37, 137 P.3d 787 (evidence that is not credible
cannot establish a reasonable belief that defendant committed the crime and
should therefore be bound over for trial).

Because Defendant produced no

credible evidence to support her claim that the lost footage would have
supported her version of events, the trial court correctly found that Defendant
had not shown a reasonable probability that the footage would have been
exculpatory. R134-35 (Add. A).
Defendant argues that the trial court

II

could not make credibility

determinations" in deciding whether she carried her burden under Tiedemann.
Br.Aplt. 39.

But when a legal standard incorporates a showing of

reasonableness, it "strongly suggests that [a trial court] must, to a certain extent,
assess the credibility of the evidence presented." Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if 24. And
II

at an evidentiary hearing, the trial court is the factfinder and as such, is the
sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses." State v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927,
929 n.6 (Utah 1982). Moreover, the trial court's ruling did not usurp the jury's
role as the ultimate factfinder. As the trial court recognized, although it found
Defendant's witness not credible, its ruling would still allow the jury to judge
for itself whether the witnesses were credible and whether the 1nissing footage
was likely to corroborate Defendant's story. R134-35.
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Defendant argues that a few lines of Officer Hansen's testimony
supported her claim that the lost footage would have supported her version.
Br.Aplt. 25, 38-39. She argues that Hansen gave conflicting testimony about
Inmate Kahn's location during the assault, testifying at the evidentiary hearing
that Kahn was four to six feet behind him as he approached Defendant and she
kicked him, but testifying earlier at the preliminary hearing that Kahn was "on
11

[his] back" and he did not know exactly where she was." Br.Aplt. 25 (quoting
R70;R175:3,4-5). Defendant argues that this snippet of Hansen's preliminary
hearing testimony supports her version that she was merely defending herself
from Kahn's aggression when she kicked Hansen. Br.Aplt. 25, 38-39.
Defendant demonstrates no conflict in Officer Hansen's testimony. As
stated, Officer Hansen explained that when he testified on cross at the
preliminary hearing that Kahn was "on [his] back" and that he did not know
exactly where Kahn was, he was testifying based on his knowledge of Kahn's
@

location at that point in the ongoing altercation, not on what he saw when he
watched the surveillance footage.

R175:5-6. Hansen never contradicted his

testimony that the surveillance footage showed Kahn four to six feet behind
him and "backing off" when Defendant looked him in the eye and kicked him
twice.

R175:3,6.

Indeed, the trial court found Hansen's testimony to be

credible. R138.
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Because there was no conflict in Hansen's testimony, his testimony did
not support Defendant's claim that the lost footage would have supported her
story. The trial court therefore correctly found that Defendant presented no
credible evidence that the lost footage would have been exculpatory. R134-35
(Add. A).
Defendant argues that the trial court required too high of a showing by
demanding that she "present extrinsic proof that the video was in fact
exculpatory." Br.Aplt. 32. But the trial court did not demand proof that the lost
footage "was in fact exculpatory."

Rather, the court analyzed whether

Defendant had shown a "'reasonable probability' that [the] lost or destroyed
evidence would be exculpatory." R133 (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,144)
(emphasis added). This is all that Tiedemann, and the trial court, required. 2007
UT 49, ,I44.
Relying on her misstatement that Tiedemann and the trial court required
proof that the lost footage was in fact exculpatory, Defendant argues that this
standard is impossible to satisfy because when evidence no longer exists, "a
defendant is precluded from proving its exculpatory content." Br.Aplt. 34. But
as explained, Tiedemann recognizes and accounts for the difficulty of proving
the precise nature of lost evidence by requiring only a showing of a reasonable
fl

probability" that the evidence would be exculpatory.
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2007 UT 49, if 44.

@

Defendant could have met her burden here with credible testimony from
herself or other witnesses.
Defendant asserts that "requiring her" to prove a reasonable probability
that the lost footage would have been exculpatory "misreads Tiedemann."
Br.Aplt. 34.
~

On the contrary, Tiededmann plainly placed on Defendant the

burden of making this showing. See 2007 UT 49, ,I44. Requiring a defendant to
carry that initial burden makes sense, because only a defendant can articulate
how the lost evidence would support her defense theory.
Defendant argues that there was a reasonable probability that the lost
footage would have been exculpatory because prison officials did not save it
even though it would have conclusively established what happened. Br.Aplt.
40-41. Defendant suggests that this should create an inference that the footage
11

must have been favorable to the defense."

Br.Apit. 41.

But Tiedemann

recognizes that the mere fact that potentially helpful evidence is lost is not
@

enough.

See 2007 UT 49, ,r44.

Rather, as explained, due process is not

II

implicated unless there is a reasonable probability that [the] lost or desh·oyed
evidence would be exculpatory." Id. Absent this showing, the best that can be
said about the evidence is that its potential to exculpate is equal to its potential
to inculpate. But that is not enough to demonstrate a fundamental unfairness.
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Moreover, all of the credible evidence here demonstrated that the lost
footage would not have been favorable to the defense but instead would have
conclusively proven the State's case. As the trial court therefore recognized, the
prosecution likely regretted that it could not present this evidence as

II

the

figurative 'Exhibit A"' in its case against Defendant. R136. All of the credible
evidence before the trial court demonstrated that had the footage not been lost,
the prosecution would not have had to settle for a compromise by offering
Defendant a plea deal that required a recommendation that her sentence run
concurrent.
In sum, the trial court correctly found that Defendant did not meet

Tiedemann's threshold showing because she provided no credible evidence that
the lost footage would have been exculpatory. R134-35 (Add. A). This was
reason enough to deny Defendant's motion.
2. Alternatively, the trial court correctly concluded that
Defendant had not shown that a weighing of Tiedemann's
factors required dismissal.
The trial court nevertheless concluded that even if Defendant had met

Tiedemann's threshold requirement, she did not show that a balancing of
Tiedemann's two factors established a due process violation requiring dismissal.
R135-38. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in weighing these factors
because the State's actions "went beyond mere negligence" and the loss of the
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video was prejudicial because it was central to the issue of guilt. Br.Aplt. 28, 43,
45-46.

Defendant also argues that a weighing of the rule 16 factors

demonstrates that dismissal was required. Br.Aplt. 24-32.

1. Dismissal was not required under the two Tiedemann
factors.
The trial court correctly weighed Tiedemann' two factors.

Defendant

argues that the first factor - "' the reason for the destruction or loss of the
evidence, including the degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the
~

State"' -favors dismissal. Br.Aplt. 41 (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 144).
She contends that the prison's lack of a policy for retaining recordings of
incidents, the failures by multiple prison officials to retain a copy of the footage,
and the importance of the lost footage, all establish that the conduct here was
more than mere negligence.

Br.Aplt. 28-31.

But defense counsel conceded

below that the State only "acted negligently by not preserving this evidence."
R43.

And Defendant does not challenge on appeal any of the trial court's

factual findings about how the footage was lost. Br.Aplt. 28-31. Those findings
amply support the trial court's conclusion that "the reasons for the loss of the
Ci}

evidence favor the State rather than dismissal of the charges." R138.
As explained, the trial court found that the footage was not "intentionally

@

eliminated, or recorded over." R137. Rather, the loss was due to "negligence
born of a multitude of factors," including "the press of other business" "and the
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fact that many personnel are involved in a setting such as a prison control unit."
R137. The trial court also found that the prison investigator's explanation for
the loss wa:s "believable" and amounted

II

to negligence but not in a high

degree." R137.
The fact that the prison does not have an established policy for saving
surveillance footage does not elevate the conduct here to something beyond
negligence. There was no evidence that prison officials intentionally chose not
to implement a policy so as to disadvantage inmates whose crimes are captured
on the surveillance cameras. R137. Nor does the fact that multiple prison
officials were involved elevate the State's culpability beyond negligence. As the
trial court found, the involvement of various prison officers reduced, rather
than heightened, those officers' liability. R137.
Nor does the fact that the lost footage would have been highly probative
undermine the trial court's analysis. Indeed, the trial court recognized that the
footage "was clearly relevant" and should have been retained.

R138.

No

evidence suggested that prison officials wanted to destroy the footage or lose it.
On the contrary, and as the trial court found, the prison investigator made
efforts to obtain a copy of the footage, but "the press of other business" delayed
her ability to timely follow up. R135-38. Contrary to Defendant's suggestion,
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the State "has strong incentive to preserve the evidence" because it bears the
burden at trial. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Additionally, all of the credible evidence before the trial court showed
@

that the footage would have done nothing but help the prosecution.

The

prosecution would have welcomed the opportunity to support its case with a
video which showed Defendant intentionally kicking Officer Hansen while
Inmate Kahn was four to six feet away. R130. The probative value of the lost
footage therefore favors the State, not Defendant.
The trial court also correctly found that Tiedemann's second factor-the
degree of prejudice to Defendant- favored the State. R136.

As explained,

Defendant presented no credible evidence that the lost footage would have
supported her version of the altercation. R136. All of the credible evidence
before the trial court therefore showed that the only party that suffered any
prejudice from the loss of the footage was the prosecution, not Defendant.
Additionally, the lost footage was not the only evidence of what occurred
during the assault.

Other eyewitnesses, including Defendant herself, were

available to testify about the events. Although the surveillance footage would
have been important evidence, it merely would have corroborated, or not, the
eyewitness testimony.
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Defendant argues that she was prejudiced because the loss of the footage
led her to plead guilty, rather than going to trial. Br.Aplt. 27. She contends that
without the surveillance footage, she had no choice but to plead guilty because
the State's case would have been based on the testimony from a prison guard,
while her defense would have been based on a witness that the trial court had
determined not to be credible. Br.Aplt. 27. But this argument presumes that the
video would have been exculpatory-a fact that no credible evidence supports.
Defendant therefore produced no evidence that she suffered any prejudice.
Moreover, as noted, the jury would not have heard the judge's credibility
finding and would have had the opportunity to assess the witnesses' credibility
for itself.
In short, even if Defendant had satisfied Tiedemann's threshold showing,
the trial court nevertheless correctly concluded that Defendant had not
demonstrated that dismissal was required based on a balancing of the two

Tiedemann factors.
2. If the trial court was required to balance the rule 16
factors, this Court should remand to allow it to do so;

alternatively, those factors favor the State.

As explained, Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously neglected
its obligation to balance the rule 16 factors, and that had it done so, it would
have been required to dismiss the case. Br.Aplt. 24-32. She therefore asks this
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Court to reverse her conviction and dismiss the charge. Br.Aplt. 49. But if
Defendant is correct that Tiedemann requires a balancing of the rule 16 factors
whenever evidence is lost, regardless of its nature, then the appropriate remedy
~

is not to reverse and remand for a dismissal. Rather, this Court should reverse
and remand for the trial court to analyze the rule 16 factors. Indeed, after this
Court announced in Tiedemann the new test for analyzing lost evidence claims
under the Utah Constitution, it remanded to allow the trial court to apply the
new two-factored test. See 2007 UT 49, if 46.
But if this Court chooses to analyze the rule 16 factors in the first instance,
it should hold that those factors favor the State, not Defendant.

The first

factor-"'the extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the existing
evidence] is actually inaccurate"' -favors the State. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if41
(quoting State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994)). There is no evidence that
the State represented that a copy of the footage existed. Rather, the prosecutor
@

told Defendant that the prison could not produce any footage of the assault.
R25. Defendant faults the prosecutor for not explaining that footage did exist,
but was lost. Br.Aplt. 26. But Defendant learned that fact almost a year before
she pled guilty. R25,150. In fact, the loss of the footage was the basis of her pretrial motion to dismiss.

R37-44.

Thus, the prosecutor did not mislead

Defendant about what evidence the State possessed, and what it did not.
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Rather than focusing on whether evidence existed or not, Defendant
argues that the State misrepresented the substance of the existing evidence
because Officer Hansen gave conflicting testimony when he testified at the
preliminary that Inmate Kahn was behind him, and then later testified that he
did not know where she was. Br.Aplt. 25. But as explained, there was no
Q

conflict in Hansen's testimony. More importantly, this factor examines whether
the State has misrepresented whether certain evidence exists, not whether there
might be internal conflicts within evidence that the Defendant knows exists. See

Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143. Thus, the first rule 16 factor favors the State.
So does the second.

It examines "' the tendency of the omission or

misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics or strategy that could
prejudice the outcome."' See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if41 (quoting Kallin, 877
P.2d at 143). As explained, the prosecution made no omission or misstatement
regarding the state of the existing evidence.

Thus, there is no basis for

Defendant to claim that any prosecutorial omission or misstatement about the
existing evidence negatively affected her trial strategy. For example, Defendant
cannot claim that she pied guilty because the State represented that it had a
copy of surveillance footage showing her intentionally kicking Officer Hansen,
when it actually did not.
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Defendant again argues that her guilty plea is evidence of prejudice
because without the footage, her trial would have boiled down to Officer
Hansen's testimony against the testimony of an inmate that the trial court had
already found not to be credible. Br.Aplt. 27. But this difficulty for Defendant
arose not because of a prosecutorial omission or misstatement about the
existing evidence, but from the loss of the footage itself. That is something that
the second Tiedemann factor considers, but not something that is relevant to the
second rule 16 factor. In any event, as explained, Defendant's argument that
her guilty plea is evidence of prejudice incorrectly presumes that the footage
would have supported Defendant's version of the events.
The third rule 16 factor also favors the State. It considers "'the culpability
of the prosecutor in omitting pertinent information or misstating the facts."' See

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,I41 (quoting Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143). As explained, the
prosecutor omitted no pertinent information and made no misstatement.
Moreover, as shown, the trial court correctly found that the footage was lost
due merely "to negligence but not in a high degree." R137.
Finally, as explained, the fourth rule 16 factor-"'the extent to which
appropriate defense investigation would have discovered the omitted or
misstated evidence'" -is irrelevant in a lost evidence situation. Tiedemann, 2007
UT 49, if41 (quoting Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143). Even if a defendant might have
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been able to discover the evidence herself, a lost evidence claim under

Tiedemann arises because the State has lost that evidence and neither party can
use it at trial. Thus, the issue is not whether a defendant could have discovered
the evidence, but whether the State's loss of the evidence amounts to a due
process violation. There is no dispute that Defendant here could not have
discovered and preserved the surveillance footage because she was not charged
with assault until three and a-half months after the assault. Rl-2. The fourth
rule 16 factor is therefore irrelevant, or at best, unhelpful, in evaluating a lost
evidence claim. Thus, even if this Court were to analyze the rule 16 factors in
the first instance, none of the relevant factors favor dismissal of Defendant's
charge.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on February 16, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General
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Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL f!im®Wl'~§') .
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/
JAN
·-' T r,ou~r

WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF ~ST

l r 20/5
JO D DEPT,

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No. 141400093
vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS
Defendant.
DATE: January 21, 2015

The above matter came before the court for decision an
v.J

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged by an information filed January 14,
2014 with assault by a prisoner.

The charge in summary is that

on September 27, 2013, while an inmate at the Utah State Prison,
defendant assaulted a guard, Robert Hansen (Hansen) with intent
to cause bodily injury.

After preliminary hearing and a

bindover, defendant entered a plea of not guilty.

On September

12, 2014, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing in summary

that the State had destroyed evidence which merited a dismissal

i.iJ

of the case.
2014.

The State filed an opposition on September 24,

Defendant filed a reply on October 6, 2014.

Oral argument

was set for October 7, 2014.
The court heard argument and determined it needed
additional factual evidence, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing

000126

for November 4, 2014, but that was postponed until December 2,
2014, by agreement _of the parties. On November 26, 2014, and
given the holiday, in effect one day before the December

2

hearing, defendant filed a supplemental memorandum in support of
her motion to dismiss.

At that hearing on December 2, 2014, the

court heard evidence and received further argument and again
determined it needed additional evidence and the State requested
additional time to respond to the supplemental memorandum of
defendant recently filed.

The court thus scheduled hearing and

argument for December 18, 2014, but due to an emergency a witness
was unavailable and further evidence and argument was heard on

Q

January 15, 2015.
Throughout each of these hearings defendant was present with
Wesley J. Howard and the State was present through Coleen K.
Witt.
The court heard argument at each of the three hearings.

The

court has considered all of the pleadings filed, including the
attachments which include the transcript of the preliminary
hearing and other materials and argument. On January 15, 2015,
the court took the issues under advisement.

Now being fully

advised, the court issues this memorandum decision.
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000127

Based on the above, the court makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Defendant was an inmate at the Utah State Prison on

September 27, 2013 in what is called Timpanogas 3, a female
~

housing unit at the Utah State Prison. Defendant shared a cell
number 416 with an inmate named Dash. Dash and Khan, a resident
of cell number 415, were being escorted back to their cells by
Hansen after recreation time and defendant was in her cell,
number 416, which is on the second tier and adjacent to number
415.

When the doors were opened defendant came out of her cell

and defendant and Khan engaged in some form of combat.

(The court

is not making any findings, of course, with respect to guilt or
innocence, but only for this motion.)

Khan had been instructed

to go to her cell #415 as Hansen followed but instead went to
stand in front of defendant's cell #416. Hansen then attempted to
insert himself between the defendant and Khan. Hansen pulled
defendant off and tried to push defendant back into her cell and
that failed and defendant came out of her cell again and Hansen
threw defendant to the ground. Hansen testified at the
preliminary hearing that defendant then kicked him twice, in the
abdomen and groin area, after looking him in the eye. Hansen said
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on direct examination Khan was not anywhere near that area.

On

cross examination he said he did not see Kahn when defendant
kicked him, Khan was behind Hansen, not on his shoulder, but
Hansen could not see Khan.
2. The prison maintains a system of cameras which captured
the events on a digital recorder, similar to a home digital video
recorder, or DVR.

It is not a video tape where an actual,

physical recording is made. That device runs continuously until
it is "full" and then other events shown on the cameras are
captured "over" older images.

It is not a permanent record

unless someone has the Information Technology (IT) department at
the Department of Corrections make, or "burn" a disc from that
recording device.

Thus after approximately 30 days, though there

is no formal policy in place, unless the images selected are
copied onto a permanent medium, such as a compact disc, the
images captured temporarily are gone and irretrievable as they
are "recorded'' over or eliminated in some way not provided to the
court by the evidence.
3. Defendant's factual claim is that as Hansen was inserting
himself between Khan and the defendant Khan continued to attempt
to strike and harm defendant, and defendant in protecting herself
from Khan accidently struck Hansen without intent to cause bodily
injury.

Thus, she claims, the recording is and would be

exculpatory.
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4. Hansen told his supervisor immediately after the event

and wrote a report of the incident.

The investigations division

contacted Hansen later that same day and he gave them a statement
as to what had occurred and received Hansen's written report.
Hansen, within an hour after the alleged assault on September 27,
2013, viewed the recording which was inside the control unit, he
played it back and could observe it.
~

He testified that it showed

that defendant kicked him and while doing so, Khan was
approximately 4-6 behind Hansen and was not doing anything
against defendant, merely standing behind Hansen while defendant

~

and Hansen were engaged in their altercation. Hansen said when he
told counsel on cross examination that he did not know where Kahn
was, that was based on what he knew at that time it was
transpiring, but viewing the recording made him aware Kahn was 46 feet behind him and was not engaging defendant when defendant
kicked Hansen.
5. An investigator, Kemp, was assigned the case and spoke
with the witnesses shortly after the event, including Hansen.

~

Kemp asked someone, an employee Kemp did not know, in the control
unit to get her, Kemp, a copy of the recording.

Kemp does not

actually work inside the prison and does not know the names of
~

the personnel and did not note it.

Kemp is an investigator who

investigates offenses within and without the prison involving
Department of Corrections interests.

At some point after 30 days
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from the event, but on a date unknown, Kemp asked someone, again
not recalling who, about the recording.

Kemp was told by a

captain on the unit that the record was not available and that if
a hard copy had been made, it was lost.

No one, in short, knows

if in fact a hard copy recording was made but no one claims it

i:~

V'

exists. Kemp and other investigators at that time of the event
and for about three months afterwards, was given an assignment to
perform background checks which kept her unusually busy beyond
what her normal duties required.
6. In part based on the press of that other business, the

case was not brought to the office of the District Attorney
{prosecution) until January 7, 2014, by which time the images
captured on the recording device were eliminated and
irretrievably lost.

The case was filed shortly thereafter, as

noted. Defendant filed a discovery request on or about January
29, 2014, asking for any video recordings of the event.

The

State responded and stated on or about May 1, 2014, that it was
"unable to provide any video of the incident as none exist as per
the Utah State Prison."
7. Defendant's cell mate Dash was called as a witness at
the evidentiary hearing of December 2, 2014.

She refused to talk

about the incident and cited the Fifth Amendment.

The court

observed defendant when that occurred and as Dash left the stand.
Defendant pulled faces and made facial expressions as if to
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question what Dash had just done in open court. The meaning of
the interchange is uncertain to the court.
8. Another female inmate, Atata, testified at that same

hearing that she was in another cell on the tier and observed
Khan behind Hansen and that Khan was reaching toward defendant
~

and trying to strike defendant when defendant hit Hansen.

Atata

·has a close relationship with defendant. Atata describes
~

defendant as her, Atata's, fiance.
true the testimony of Atata.

The court does not accept as

That is not based solely on the

relationship between Atata and defendant, but the court also
~

observed defendant and Atata while Atata was testifying. It
appeared to the court, and the court so finds, that defendant was
making facial gestures and expressions of varying sorts to Atata
depending on what Atata was saying in her testimony.

Further,

Atata admitted she was looking at the event from an angle, as she
was in another cell, and Atata admitted she did not see
everything but saw most of the event.

The court thus does not

accept her testimony at face value as being testimony the court
can rely on to find the events were as she described.

Based on the above findings, the court enters these:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DISCUSSION

The law is set forth in State v. Tiedemann,

162 P.3d 1106
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(UT. 2007). When there is a claim by a defendant that evidence is
lost or destroyed, the court is to engage in a multi-step
process. This court must engage in a balancing of factors.

The

defendant must first demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that
lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory. It is not
sufficient to show a possibility that the evidence would be
exculpatory.

If a "reasonable probability" is shown, then the

court is to consider the reason for the destruction or loss or
failure of preservation of the evidence, including the degree of
negligence or culpability on the part of the State, and the
decree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality
and importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case
as a whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence.
The main principle is fundamental fairness.

The Utah Supreme

Court noted that if a sanction is warranted, it could be because
of the serious conduct of the State or the degree of prejudice to
the defendant. Trial courts are instructed to balance the factors
to insure fairn~ss.
The court must first examine, as a threshold, whether
defendant has demonstrated that it is reasonably probable that
the recording would be exculpatory. Just what is "reasonably
probable" is not as clear as the court would like.

Here,

defendant produced a witness, her fiance Atata, who said Khan was
engaged in fighting with defendant when defendant struck Hansen.

-8-
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The court is aware at this point only of the preliminary hearing
testimony and other testimony given by Hansen on December 2,
2014, as well as that of Dash and Atata on that same date.

Whether there are other witnesses, prison staff or inmates, who
will at trial describe what they observed that day, if there are
any such witnesses, is unknown to the court. Of course the
parties are free to produce whatever witnesses they believe have
relevant information.
The court gives little credit, at this point, based on its
observations of Atata, defendant, and their relationship, to the
testimony of Atata. Simply asserting that the recording would be
helpful to defendant is obviously nothing more than argument that
possibly the recording would be exculpatory.

There must be

something in the evidence before the court NOW that shows the
court there is some reasonable basis on which to believe the
recording would show what defendant claims, that the striking of
Hansen was either an accident while defendant was trying to
engage in combat with Khan or that the striking was justified or
occurred for some reason other than as claimed by Hansen that it
was done to inflict bodily injury intentionally or knowingly. The
only possible evidence defendant can assert that is now before
the court is the testimony of Atata.

To be reasonable evidence,

to this court, that evidence must be believable.

To this court,

based on the findings above, the testimony was not believable and

-9-
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thus is not reasonable.

A

jury may well conclude differently,

however, and the court's belief at this point of course is
irrelevant to what may be presented at a jury trial.

The court

is not indicating such evidence cannot be presented by defendant
at a trial. The court is merely ruling that defendant has not
shown a reasonable probability that the recording would be
exculpatory.
Thus, the court does not need to examine the reasons for the
destruction or failure to preserve nor must the court determine
the degree of prejudice suffered by defendant, if any.

However,

even if it is reasonably probable that the recording is
exculpatory, the reasons for its non-existence do not support a
dismissal. IF the court is wrong about the exculpatory nature of
the recording, dismissal is not appropriate because of the facts
and circumstances which resulted in the failure to preserve.
First, in the court's view the State is incorrect about the
destruction of the evidence and motivations.

Obviously the

"prosecution" here has done absolutely nothing to destroy or fail
to preserve evidence.

The destruction came about by the action,

or inaction, of the Department of Corrections personnel in
failing to preserve evidence that was readily available at the
time of the incident.

The recording was gone before the case was

filed. The State argued wrongly, respectfully, and contrary to
common sense frankly, about motivations.

-10-
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exactly as Hansen said, certainly it would seem to this court
that common sense would indicate that recording would be
retained, the figurative "Exhibit A", so to speak, in the case
against defendant.

The motivation, frankly, to destroy or fail

to preserve such a recording would come if the recording
supported some other factual situation than the one Hansen
describes.

If it showed contrary to what Hansen said, then it

would make more logical sense to destroy it rather than if it
supported him. The court does not believe that the lack of the
evidence, however, is related to any "decision" made by anyone.
Obviously, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for this
court to understand why prison personnel would not, with full
knowledge that a claimed assault had occurred by an inmate
against a guard, maintain a recording of that event.

Obviously,

if the recording shows what Hansen testified it shows, there is
no prejudice at all to defendant in the destruction of the
recording.

Only if the recording shows in essence what defendant

claims would there be prejudice by its unavailablity.

Because

this court does not believe defendant has shown any reasonable,
believable probability the recording showed what defendant
claims, it does not matter why or how it was destroyed, or more
properly not retained.

But, as indicated, the court is

discussing that element in the event the court is incorrect about
the exculpatory nature of the event.

-11-
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the investigative team, and all associated with this event, would
preclude such a motion and preclude the requirement that the
court attempt to "divine" what the recording showed.
Here, the reasons given for the lack of preservation are
believable, and amount to negligence but not in a high degree.
The court finds no culpable conduct by anyone in the Department
of Corrections. If the court believed that there was an
intentional decision to record over this event, of course, the
result would probably be different.
Hansen cannot cause the recording to be preserved.

The

investigator, the court finds, asked the proper personnel to
"make me a copy" of the event.

It was not intentionally

eliminated, or recorded over, the court finds, but it clearly
should have been retained.

The nameless person who was asked to

make a recording perhaps, for any number of reasons, evidently
failed to do so.

The investigator, in the press of other

business, failed to follow up in a timely way.

That does not, in

this court's view, favor defendant to the extent that the court
should or could find a malicious motive or culpable conduct by
the investigative team at Corrections.

It was negligence, but

negligence born of a multitude of factors and the fact that many
personnel are involved in a setting such as a prison control
unit.

Just why a recording was not made, and who failed to make

that recording, are not found as facts by the court, other than

-12-
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it was institutional negligence.

The investigator should have,

respectfully, conducted her investigation in a way that retains
relevant evidence.

This recording was clearly relevant.

The

failure to do so, however, was at most negligence, and not gross
negligence and certainly not intentional.
So, while the court feels it need not examine the reasons
for the lack of preservation, if the court is wrong about there
being a reasonable probability about the exculpatory nature of
the recording, the reasons for the loss of the evidence favor the
State rather than dismissal of the charges. Defendant is still
~

free to testify and bring witnesses to the trial, though of
course she has not burden to do so. The State is free to present
whatever relevant evidence it has.

The actual participant,

Hansen, has at this point presented credible evidence.

Many,

indeed almost all, assaultive incidents resulting in a trial are
not recorded and the finder of fact is required to listen to the
witnesses and determine what happened.

The fact that this event

happened to be recorded does not mean that the failure to retain
that recording should result in a dismissal of the case.

Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to preserve
evidence is DENIED.

The matter is set for a status conference at 1:30 p.rn. on
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January 29, 2015, where a trial date will be scheduled.

This Memorandum Decision is the Order of the court and no
other order is required.

DATED this

-14-
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1

Judge:

Uh Ms. Witt is this your case?

2

ATP:

Yes it is Your Honor.

3

Judge:

You may call your first witness.

4

ATP:

Uh the State would call Officer Hansen to the stand.

5

Judge:

Officer if you'll please approach. If you II come right up here please

G;)

1

~

and raise your right hand.

6
7

Cierk:

Swearing in of witness.

8

Witness 1:

I do.

9

Judge:

Sir if you'll be seated right at the witness stand. Once you're

G;

10

comfortably seated go ahead and pull your chair up. That

11

microphones flexible so bend it however it's comfortable for you. If

12

you'd please state your name and spell your last name for the

13

record.

<;i

GJ

14

Witness 1:

Hansen, H-A-N-S-E-N.

15

Judge:

Thank you and if you wouldn't mind please state your first name as
G)

16

well.

17

Witness 1:

Ronald.

18

Judge:

Ronald, thank you Mr. Hansen. Counsel?

19

6)

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF OFFICER HANSEN

20

ATP:

Um Officer Hansen who are you currently employed with?

21

Witness 1:

The Department of Corrections for the State of Utah.

22

ATP:

And how long ... I'm sorry?

23

Witness 1:

For the State of Utah with the Department of Corrections.

ooooss
1

~

1
(.i)

~

ATP:

2

And how long have you been employed with the uh Department of
Corrections?

3

Witness 1:

Uh since 2008, Feb ... February 5, 2008 till. ..

4

ATP:

And what are your duties as an officer with the Department of
Corrections?

5
6

Witness 1:

Uh safety and security of the institution. Protecting the in ... uh

7

escorting inmates to and from different rec times and things like

8

that.

~

ATP:

So where are you actually stationed or where's your work?

10

Witness 1:

Right. .. right now I'm in mail and property.

11

ATP:

And in 2 ... in September of 2013 where were you working?

12

Witness 1:

I. .. I was ... I was posted in Timpanogas 3.

9
~

~

~

~

13

·ATP:

And Timpanogas 3 is where?

14

Witness 1:

It's uh the ... the fe ... female prison for the State of Utah.

15

ATP:

And is that in Salt Lake County?

16

Witness 1:

Yes it is.

17

ATP:

Okay. And um do you recall an incident that occurred in the prison

18

on September 27, 2013?

19

Witness 1:

Yes ... yes ma'am I do.

20

ATP:

Okay and could you explain what that incident was?

21

Witness 1:

Um I was taking 2 inmates back from the yard, they were out in the

~

22
-..i)

23

yard on rec and I was taking them back in to section 4.
ATP:

And who were the 2 inmates?

2

0000.56
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1

Witness 1:

Uh Fatima Kahn and Samantha Dash.

2

ATP:

Okay. And you were taking them from the yard into ...
@

3

Witness 1:

From the yard in ... back inside the building.

4

ATP:

Okay. And where were you taking them to?

5

Witness 1:

Sec ... section 4. They were ... they ... that's where they were housed
in section 4 on the top tier.

6
7

ATP:

Okay. And uh when you got to section 4 what were you going to do
~

with Kahn and Dash?

8
9

GD

Witness 1:

I was gonna have.•.. I was gonna lock them up to their cell doors

10

and have their doors popped and put them back in their ... in their

11

cells cause their rec time was done.

12

ATP:

Now were Kahn and Dash, were they cell mates?

13

Witness 1:

No, no ma'am they ... they were not.

14

ATP:

Okay. So what was the cell assignments at that time?

15

Witness 1:

Um Samantha Dash and uh was living in 415 and Kahn was in 416.

16

ATP:

And did they have cell mates?

17

Witness 1:

Yes, they did.

18

ATP:

Okay. So do you recall uh who Dash's cell mate was?

19

Witness 1:

Dash was living with De ... DeJesus at the time.

20

ATP:

And um DeJesus, uh she s the Defendant in this case?

21

Witness 1:

Yes ma'am.

22

ATP:

Could you just point her out and identify her to the Court?

23

Witness 1:

She's right there.

(;)

~

~

G;

1
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1

Judge:

Record will reflect identification.

2

ATP:

Thank you Your Honor. Okay so at this time DeJesus was a ... a

@

prisoner at uh the Board of... or at the Department of Corrections?

3

<ii)

4

Witness 1:

Yes ma'am.

5

ATP:

Okay. And so what cell was she in?

6

Witness 1:

She was in 4 ... 4 .. .415.

7

ATP:

415. Okay so when you'ie tran ... when you're bringing her back to

l,ip

the tier I believe you called it. ..

8
9
~

~

Witness 1:

Uh-huh.

10

ATP:

uh what exactly occurred?

11

Witness 1:

Um I asked Kahn to go and stand in front of her ... her cell door and

12

Samantha Dash and I were walking up ... we were walking up the

13

stairs, I was behind them. Samantha Dash uh said Hansen check

14

this out and kind of slowed down her pace of me getting up the

15

stairs. Uh Kahn stood outside of DeJesus' cell ... Samantha Das h's

16

and DeJesus' cell and leaned up against the ... the arm rail.

Vi)

~

17

ATP:

And what happened at that point?

18

Witness 1:

When I got up to the cells I was ... they were talking through the
door, they were kind of arguing.

19
20

ATP:

Who was talking ... arguing?

21

Witness 1:

DeJesus was arguing with Kahn.

22

ATP:

Okay.

.,$)
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1

Witness 1:

And DeJesus had stated "are we really gonna do this in front of the
cops".

2

@

3

ATP:

Okay. And then what happened?

4

Witness 1:

My ... my partner had opened the cell doors before I was ready for

5
6

'em and DeJesus came out and swung at uh Kahn.
ATP:

©

Okay. So De ... DeJesus came actually out, physically out of the
cell?

7

~

8

Witness 1:

Out of her cell, yes.

9

ATP:

And started swinging at Kahn?

10

Witness 1:

Yes ma'am.

11

ATP:

Uh did she make any contact with Kahn?

12

Witness 1:

Yes she did.

13

ATP:

And uh what did you do?

14

Witness 1:

I. .. I pulled DeJesus off of Kahn and tried to put DeJesus back in

15

~

~

her cell and close the door.
Q

16

ATP:

And uh how did you do that?

17

Witness 1:

I picked her up and carried her there.

18

ATP:

Okay and did you put her back in the cell?

19

Witness 1:

Yes I did I just wasn't a ... able to secure the door.

20

ATP:

Okay. And when you weren't able to secure the door what

21

"
,

G:.i

happened?

5

000059
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1
~

DeJesus came back out and they engaged again fighting and that's

2

when I pushed DeJesus to the ... to the floor uh towards the

3

showers of the top tier.

4
(.i)

Witness 1:

ATP:

Okay. So you pushed her to the floor, where was Kahn after you
pushed uh DeJesus to the floor?

5

6

Witness 1:

Kahn was ... was behind me a few feet.

7

ATP:

A few feet behind you?

8

Witness 1:

Yes ma'am.

9

ATP:

Okay and then what did you do at that point?

Witness 1:

I. .. I closed the distance trying to ... I was gonna s ... secure

~

~

10
11
12

~

De ... DeJesus and that's when she kicked me in my abdomen.
ATP:

13

Okay. So you were closing the distance between yourself and
DeJesus?

14

Witness 1:

Yes ma'am.

15

ATP:

And Kahn was a few feet behind you?

16

Witness 1:

Yes ma'am.

17

ATP:

Okay and when you approached DeJesus you said you got kicked

v)

~

18
19

where?
Witness 1:

20

I got kicked in my lower ab ... abdomen and then once again in my
uh right thigh.

~

21

ATP:

22
~

23

Okay. Now when this kicking occurred was there any kind of eye
contact with the ... with DeJesus?

Witness 1:

Yes ma'am she looked directly at me and then kicked me.

000060
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1

ATP:

2 times?

2

Witness 1:

2 times.
@

3

ATP:

And did you feel any pain from either of those kicks?

4

Witness 1:

The first one no, the one in my leg I did, yes.

5

ATP:

And uh was Kahn anywhere near that area?

6

Witness 1:

No ma'am she wasn't.

7

ATP:

I have nothing further at this time.

8

Judge:

Thank you, Mr. Howard?

~

@'

CROSS EXAMINATION

9
10

ATD:

Officer Hansen this facility that. .. what did you call it, Timpanogas?

11

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

12

ATD:

Is that exclusive for female prisoners?

13

Witness 1:

Yes it is.

14

ATD:

And is that a single level or multi-level (inaudible)?

15

Witness 1:

Uh there ... there's 2 tiers in the building. There's a bottom tier and

Gi)

~

Ci)

16
17

a top tier.
ATD:

18

And cells 14 and 6 ... excuse me, 415 and 416 were on the upper
tier?

19

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

20

ATD:

So as you're approaching cells 415 and 416 you go up a set of
stairs?

21
22

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

000061.
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1
~

~

ATD:

When inmates Dash and Kahn were ... before you brought them into
the section they had been where? Out. ... outside?

2
3

Witness 1:

Yes, yes ...

4

ATD:

In a recreation area?

5

Witness 1:

(inaudible) yeah, yes sir.

6

ATD:

And had you observed them while they were out there?

7

Witness 1:

Yeah they uh inmate and Kahn and Dash were talking out in the

(i)

bullpen and ...

8
9

;;;

~

ATD:

They were talking ... did you uh get any indication of hostility
between either of the others ... either towards the other?

10
11

Witness 1:

No sir.

12

ATD:

These cells, 415 and 416 are they side by side?

13

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

14

ATD:

And there's no intervening cell?

15

Witness 1:

No.

16

ATD:

How... how close are the ... what's the distance between the two

v)

17
~

18

doors?
Witness 1:

19

I believe on those two cells there's about 8-10 feet between those
two doors.

•:

20

AT

21

Witness 1:

22

AT

23

Witness 1:

So you're over 6 foot?

~

~

•:

Yes sir.
How tall are you?
I'm 6'1.

8

1

ATD:

2

So you'd be easily able to lie down in the distance between those
two doors?

@

3

Witness 1:

Yes.

4

ATD:

So when you were going up the stairs Dash and Kahn were what in
front of you?

5

@

6

Witness 1:

The ... yes, they ... they were in front of me.

7

ATD:

Both of them?

8

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

9

ATD:

And weie they shackled in any way?

10

Witness 1:

No sir.

11

ATD:

So you ... you instructed Kahn, I believe you said, to stand in front of

GI;

~

a cell?

12

@

13

Witness 1:

I wanted her to go stand in front of her door.

14

ATD:

Sorry now, say that again?

15

Witness 1:

I wanted her to stand in front of her cell door but she took up a post
G)

16

17

in front of DeJesus' door instead.
ATD:

18

And then you heard someone say "do we wanna do this in front of
the cops"?

G,,

19

Witness 1:

I heard De ... DeJesus say are we gonna do this in front of the cops.

20

ATD:

You're quite clear it was Ms. DeJesus?

21

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

22

ATD:

And Kahn did not move? She stayed in front of DeJesus' cell?

23

Witness 1:

Yes.

~

c;.:,
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~

~

1

ATD:

Did you hear any other conversation between the 2 of them?

2

Witness 1:

They ... they were ar. .. arguing about something, I'm not. ..

3

ATD:

But you could tell that there was aggressive language between the
2 of them?

4
@

5

Witness 1:

(inaudible) yes.

6

ATD:

And Kahn wouldn't move down to her own cell?

7

Witness 1:

No.

8

ATD:

So at some point is ... are you up the stairs up onto the second tier

VB

when the doors are uh unlocked?

9
~

~

10

Witness 1:

Yes sir I am.

11

ATD:

And is cell 415 close by the top of the stairs?

12

Witness 1:

Yes.

13

ATD:

Like the next cell or?

14

Witness 1:

It is ... it's not directly at the top of the stairs it is off to the side.

15

ATD:

And the um so the off... the other officer opened the door before

~

you gave some kind of a signal?

16

..i)

~

17

Witness 1:

Yes from ...

18

ATD:

Is that in violate ... excuse me?

19

Witness 1:

from the yeah ... she ... she was in the control room.

20

ATD:

And uh is it in violation of normal protocol? Aren't you supposed to

21
22

give some kind of a signal to open the doors?
Witness 1:

Yeah she ... yeah, yes sir.

~

10

000064
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.1

ATD:

2

And so the door was opened and do you see inmate Kahn make
any attempt to get into DeJesus' cell?
GD

3

Witness 1:

No sir.

4

ATD:

But uh DeJesus came out?

5

Witness 1:

De ... yes 1 yes she did.

6

ATD:

And they at that point engaged in some kind of mutual combat?

7

Witness 1:

Yes, they ... they were fighting.

8

ATD:

Fighting, throwing arms, fists?

9

Witness 1:

Swinging, pulling hair, yes.

ATD:

Okay. And then you then grabbed DeJesus and physically moved

10
11

(i)

G

Q

her into her cell?

12

Witness 1:

Yes I did.

13

ATD:

Is that in keeping with standard protocol for you to have physical

14

Gi)

contact?

15

Witness 1:

16

ATD:

I ... I was trying to ... I was trying to control the situation sir.
G;J

17

What. .. what does the ... what does the protocol. .. the standard
operating procedure call for?

18

Witness 1:

Isolate and contain the ... the incident.

19

ATD:

And by isolate does that mean physically get involved or ...

20

Witness 1:

Some ... sometimes, yes.

21

ATD:

does it call for at times using perhaps mace?

22

Witness 1:

Uh-huh.

23

ATD:

You ... you carry mace?

(;)
.

Q

~

11

000065
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~
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~

ViJ

1

Witness 1:

Yes sir ... yes sir I do.

2

ATD:

You don't carry any firearm inside the prison?

3

Witness 1:

No sir, we don't.

4

ATD:

Do you have ... carry a like a nightstick, a billy club?

5

Witness 1:

No just uh just uh OC spray.

6

ATD:

Okay. But you didn't take that out at that time?

7

Witness 1:

No I didn't.

8

ATD:

And you pushed Ms. DeJesus back into cell 415?

9

Witness 1:

Uh 416, she was living in 416.

ATD:

Oh excuse me, I got that. .. so DeJesus, that was her assigned cell,

10
11

@

416?

12

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

13

ATD:

And Dash was assigned to 416 as well?

14

Witness 1:

Yes, they were cell mates.

15

ATD:

And then Kahn was in 415?

16

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

17

ATD:

So as you go to ... get to the top of the stairs and approach down the

~

~

~

18
19

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

20

ATD:

Which cell is the next one at the top after you leave the top of the

21
22

~

uh like there's a catwalk of some kind?

23

stairs, 15 or 16?
Witness 1:

16 is at the top of the ... top of the stairs just to the right. 17 and 18
take up the next two cells down to the left towards the showers.

000066
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1

ATD:

So Kahn actually passed her cell and went down to ... or excuse me,
yes ...

2

@

3

Witness 1:

She pa ... she should've passed DeJesus' cell and gone and stood
in front of her cell.

4
5

ATD:

She should have?

6

Witness 1:

That. .. she should have, yes.

7

ATD:

Okay. So 15 is beyond 16?

8

Witness 1:

Yes.

9

ATD:

Was the cell door to 416 opened at the same time as 415?

10

Witness 1:

Yes sir it was.

11

ATD:

So they ...

12

Witness 1:

(inaudible) ...

13

ATD:

simultaneously?

14

Witness 1:

at the time they ... they ... DeJesus, Kahn and Samantha Dash and

~

G)

G

Gi)

15

the other cell ... the 4 of them, they were all living together. I don't

16

recall who was living with Kahn at the time. They're all the same

17

level so that they can recreate at the same time, they can be out at

18

the same time so we can open multiple doors at the same time to

19

let them in and out because they are of the same ... the same levels.

20

So it is customary to open the doors of all the ... all the level. .. all

21

the ... like the A levels ... not the A levels, but the B levels and C

22

levels and D levels can all come out at the same time. So they

23

were at the ... they were the same privilege level so the two doors

~

(;.i

w

Gr.>
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1

were open at the same time so that they could go back into their

2

house.

3

ATD:

4
~

same level?

5

Witness 1:

They're on the same tier and then the ...

6

ATD:

And ...

7

Witness 1:

inmates have the same classification level.

8

ATD:

and I'll just interrupt you for a second. Is every cell on that tier the

~'

9

va

same privilege level as you ...

10

Witness 1:

Not necessarily.

11

ATD:

not necessarily. So there's the capability to open 1 door at a time

12
~

Okay just to make sure I understand. Cells 416 and 415 are on the

rather than ...

13

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

14

ATD:

the whole set? Or the whole set can be opened at once?

15

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

16

ATD:

You've been in the control room?

17

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

18

ATD:

You know how it works?

19

Witness 1:

Uh-huh, yes sir.

20

ATD:

There's ... is there a button there for each cell door?

21

Witness 1:

Yes sir there is.

22

ATD:

And is there a button to open all doors at once?

23

Witness 1:

Yes there is but it's uh we don't use that.

v;)

(ii

~

~
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1

ATD:

But in ... in this case, as far as you know, 15 .. .415 and 416 were
opened at the same time?

2
3

Witness 1 :

Yes sir.

4

ATD:

And when uh 415, which is, if I understand correctly w_as Kahn's

5

cell door was opened, she didn't go down to that?

(;i)
'

6

Witness 1:

No, she did not.

7

ATD:

Okay. She ... she uh essentially waited for DeJesus to come out of

9
10

G;

the cell?

8
Witness 1:

Yes sir.

ATD:

Then they engage in this mutual combat. You got engaged and

11

you separated them physically and you put Ms. DeJesus back in

12

her cell, 416?
Q

13

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

14

ATD:

But your ... the control officer ...

15

Witness 1:

I was not able to close the door because she rushed the door to

16

Q

come back out and continue fighting.

17

ATD:

So can you manually close the door from ...

18

Witness 1:

Yes.

19

ATD:

And lock it?

20

Witness 1:

Yes. Once the ... once the door. .. door is closed its ... its locked.

21

ATD:

So she wouldn't allow you to close the door, she ...

22

Witness 1:

She would not allow me to close the door.

23

ATD:

She slipped past you?

000069
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~
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1

Witness 1:

She pushed past me, she didn't slip pass she (inaudible).

2

ATD:

So at that time, you're on this cat walk uh 415 is to your right as

3

~

you're facing DeJesus cell?

4

Witness 1:

Yes.

5

ATD:

And then you're right in front of 416?

6

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

7

ATD:

So Kahn is to your right as well?

8

Witness 1:

Yes she's down ... she's just down ... down the stair behind me.

9

ATD:

And DeJesus came in out of 416 and she tried to get past you

VI

vo

~

10

down ... back down to Kahn?

11

Witness 1:

Back down to re-engage with Kahn.

12

ATD:

But you're indicating that she didn't get down to Kahn again?

13

Witness 1:

No I was ... the second ... when she came out of the cell that was

14
,J

15

when I pushed her to the left and ...
ATD:

16
17
~

Kay so how far ... but Kahn was immediately to your right? She
didn't go down to her cell?

Witness 1:

Kahn ... she was on my back, I don't know exactly where she was.

18

She was ... she was not. .. she was no longer on my shoulder

19

though, I could not see her behind me, she was behind me.

20

ATD:

Okay. So she could've been as close as inches away but you

v;J

21
22

couldn't see her?
Witness 1:

But I could not see her, no.

~
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1

ATD:

And then at some point you say that Ms. DeJesus kicked in your
direction?

2

G;}

3

Witness 1:

She kicked me sir.

4

ATD:

And hit you in the stomach?

5

Witness 1:

Yes.

6

ATD:

And then she kicked a second time and hit you in the?

7

Witness 1:

Hit me in the ... in the upper right thigh.

8

ATD:

Okay.

9

Witness 1:

To ... towards my ... my groin.

ATD:

And you couldn't tell because your back was to Kahn, you couldn't

10

Q

GJ

tell if she was immediately there or not?

11
12

@

Witness 1:

No but DeJesus looked me right. .. right in the eye before she kicked
G)

me the first time, she knew where she was kicking.

13
14

ATD:

Kay. Now this is a highly secured facility?

15

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

16

ATD:

Timpanogas ... I don't know what the category of security is, if it's

GJ

maximum or minimum, what. .. how would you ...

17

18

Witness 1:

Timp ... Timpanogas 3 is the maximum sec ... security unit.

19

ATD:

Maximum secure unit for females?

20

Witness 1:

Yes sir.

21

ATD:

And so there must be video surveillance all around the place?

22

Witness 1:

Yes there is.

~

000071
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@

~

ATD:

And there is a video camera that would be pointing directly in this
area towards 4 ... cell 416?

2
3

Witness 1:

Yes sir there is.

4

ATD:

Now do you know anything about that video that. .. there should be
a video then of that activity?

5
6

Witness 1:

There ... there is a video but I am not authorized to ... to uh to record
the ... record the information off of that, that is above me.

7

VJ
8

ATD:

turned off or was not working?

9

"'
vJ)

10

Kay so you have no knowledge that the video equipment was

Witness 1:

11

The video e ... equipment was working because I reviewed the fight
afterwards.

12

ATD:

You reviewed the video?

13

Witness 1:

Yes I did.

14

ATD:

Okay. So you saw the video ...

15

Witness 1:

Afterwards, yes.

16

ATD:

but. .. but you had no authority to record it yourself?

17

Witness 1:

No sir.

18

ATD:

So who would be immediately in charge of retaining that. .. that

,J

~

19
20

video?
Witness 1:

All ... all the recordings have to come through the investigations

.;;;

~

21

have to order it and then they send (inaudible) they send uh BIT

22

who is our. .. our IT department in to rip the recording.

23

ATD:

So there's not 1 person it's just an investigations department. ..

18

000072
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1

Witness 1:

Department. ..

2

ATD:

or division?
G;)

3

Witness 1:

Yes, sir.

4

ATD:

How soon after this incident did you view that video?

5

Witness 1:

It was about 15 minutes afterwards.

6

ATD:

Kay, thank you.

7

Judge:

Any follow up Ms. Witt?

8

ATP:

Just one clarification.

9

Judge:

Sure.

Q

RE-DIRECT OF OFFICER HANSEN

10

11

Ci}

ATP:

Q

When you said you watched the video 15 ... about 15 minutes later
was it a ... like a separate video or did you just watch a playback?

12

G)

13

Witness 1:

We just watched a ... a playback.

14

ATP:

Okay. I have nothing further Your Honor.

15

Judge:

Alright, very good. Mr. Hansen thank you very much, you may step
(.y

16

down.

17

Witness 1:

Thank you.

18

Judge:

Any other witnesses today Ms. Witt?

19

ATP:

Uh no Your Honor the State rests.

20

Judge:

Mr. Howard do you plan on calling witnesses?

21

ATD:

Your Honor we don't have any witnesses today. I've advised Ms.

~

22

DeJesus of her right to present evidence today and advised against

23

that an I believe she's gonna take my advice.

19

Q

G
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1

Judge:

Is that true Ms. DeJesus?

2

Def:

Yes sir.

3

Judge:

Alright, very good. Uh any argument Ms. Witt?

4

ATP:

Uh no Your Honor the State would submit.

5

Judge:

Mr. Howard?

6

ATD:

No argument.

7

Judge:

Alright. I find that there s probable cause to believe the crimes

1

vj)

viJ

~

8

were committed and further that Ms. DeJesus committed the crime,

9

I'm therefore binding the case over to Judge Lubeck. Uh would you

10

want to have

2 or 4 weeks Mr. Howard?

11

ATD:

I think we need 4 weeks Your Honor ...

12

Judge:

Okay.

13

ATD:

to see if we can locate this video.

14

Judge:

Alright. Let's set it for the 14th of July then at 8:30 in the morning

15

for a felony ... actually at

16

conference in front of Judge Lubeck. Alright, thank you.

1:30 in the afternoon for a felony pretrial

...J

17

CASE BOUND OVER

,..;;

20
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4
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5
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6
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7
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WEST JORDAN, UTAH - DECEMBER 2, 2014

2

JUDGE BRUCE LUBECK

3

(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

MR. HOWARD: We're ready on the Dejesus matter, Your

7

THE COURT: The State vs. Dejesus,

8

9

10

here with Mr. Howard.

This is the time set for an

So, Ms. Witt, you have a witness?

MS. WITT: Your Honor, the State's going to recall

14

Officer Hansen to the stand.

15

video.

16

occurred.

18
19

He is someone who did watch the

It wasn't a video - watched the playback after it

THE COURT: Well,
Well, yeah.

let's see.

Just a sec.

Okay.

Go ahead and call him, and we'll -

Officer, step up here, and raise your right hand,

20

and take an oath, please?

21

right hand, and ...

22

Some witnesses?

What -

13

17

She's

evidentiary hearing.

11

12

141400093.

Just anywhere there,

raise your

RONALD HANSEN

23

Having first been duly sworn,

24

upon his oath as follows:

25

THE COURT: Have a seat up here.

testified

Please tell us
1

1

your name and spell your name after you get comfortable and

2

fairly close to that microphone, please?

3

THE WITNESS: Ronald Hansen, H-A-N-S-E-N.

4

THE COURT: Thank you.

5

Ms. Witt?

6

MS. WITT: Thank you.

7

DTRECT EXAMINATION

8

BY MS. WITT:

9

Q

10

Do you recall testifying in this matter on June

17 th Of 2014?

11

A

Yes, ma'am,

12

Q

I just want to do some clarifying questions

I do.

13

regarding the playback of the events that occurred that day.

14

You stated, when you testified, that you did have an

15

opportunity to view the playback of what occurred?

16

A

Yes , ma ' am .

17

Q

And do you recall how far after - how long after

18

the event that occurred?

19

A

It was about 30 minutes.

20

Q

And when you watched the playback, what did you

21

22

observe?
A

I saw the altercation, and I saw Dejesus corning -

23

you know,

24

Dejesus to the ground and went to engage to subdue her,

25

that's when she kicked me, and Con was behind me.

I saw what happened.

And then after I pushed

2

1
2

Q

So do you recall seeing where Con was at the point

that you pushed the defendant onto the ground?

3

A

During the incident or on the playback?

4

Q

On the playback.

5

A

On the playback, she was a few feet - between four

6
7

8

to six behind me.
Q

Behind you when you pushed the defendant to the

ground?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And it was after you pushed the defendant to the

11

ground that she kicked you?

12 ·

A

Yes, ma'am.

13

Q

And I believe you testified it was two times?

14

A

Yes, ma'am, twice.

15

Q

So when you say Con was about four to six feet

16

behind you, what was she doing?

17

A

She was disengaged.

18

Q

So she wasn't at - by disengaging, do you mean she

19

She was just backing off.

wasn't actively trying to engage the defendant?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And as far as the playback, was there, to your

22

knowledge, ever a video made of this incident?

23

A

To my knowledge, no.

24

Q

So the playback,

25

A

Yes, ma'am.

is that some sort of DVR system?

3

-1

I
1
2
3

Q

Okay.

And that's how - you just rewinded i t ,

then played it back?
A

Yes, ma'am.

4

MS. WITT: I have nothing further,

5

THE COURT: Mr. Howard?

6
7

8
9

and

Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. HOWARD:
Q

So Officer Hansen, you recall we were here for a

preliminary hearing back in June of this year?

10

A

Yes, sir.

11

Q

And I got to ask you some questions.

12

that - that at one point,

13

immediately -

Do you recall

G

I said so how far - that Con was

14

This is on page 16 of the preliminary hearing.

15

MS. WITT: Thank you.

16

MR. HOWARD: On line 15.
r.·\

w

17

Q

(BY MR. HOWARD) - was immediately to your right?

18

She didn't go down to her cell?

19

on my back.

20

she was not.

21

could not see her behind me.

22

asked,

23

you, but you couldn't see her?"

24

could not see her,

25

hearing, you didn't know where she was?

Your answer,

neon?

She was

I don't know exactly where she was. She was She was no longer on my shoulder, though.
She was behind me."

I

And I

uso she could have been as close as inches away from

no."

And your answer,

uBut I

So at the time of the preliminary
But now you're
4

1

saying that the video feedback that you saw immediately after

2

the incident, that you are now remembering a month -

3

and a half later, you are recalling now that Con was several

4

feet behind you?
A

5

6

During the incident,

a

year

I did not know where she was.

I was asked about, after viewing the playback, where Con was.

7

Q

ushe was on my back.

Let me read your response.

8

don't know exactly where she was."

9

preliminary hearing, you didn't know exactly where she was?

10

A

Let me clarify.

I

So the time at the

During the incident that was going

11

on, which I believe is what you were referring to in your

12

question, was I did not know where Con was while the incident

13

was occurring - while we were engaged.

14

Q

So are you indicating that you did not say that at

15

the preliminary hearing -

16

was?"

17

A

No.

18

Q

Okay.

ur

don't know exactly where she

I'm not saying I didn't say that,

no.

And so your position now is that these two

19

had been fighting and engaging with each other, you pushed or

20

forced Dejesus to the ground, and Con disengaged and floated

21

backwards, and had no violent action whatsoever?

22

with your back turned to her,

23

A

24

ground,

25

She just -

she suddenly became submissive?

After I'd moved - after I had pushed Dejesus to the
I did not feel Con on my back anymore.
MR. HOWARD: Thank you.
5

1

MS. WITT: Just clarifying -

2

THE COURT: Sure.

3

MS. WITT: - Your Honor.

4

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

5

BY MS. WITT:

6

Q

Now, you did testify at the preliminary hearing

7

that that is correct, that you did testify that.

8

in your testimony -

9

10

And I'm referring to page six of the preliminary
hearing.

11

12

But earlier

You were actually asked specifically where Con was
after you pushed her to the floor.

Do you recall that?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And what was your response to that?

15

A

A few feet behind me.

16

Q

Okay.

So when you're saying - when you tried to

17

explain that what you were testifying as far as on my back,

18

just behind me, that's your recollection as the events were

19

occurring?

20
21

A

You didn't know where she was?
While the events were occurring,

I did not know

where she was.

22

Q

But you did learn that she was a few feet behind

24

A

Yes,

25

Q

And you did testify to that earlier in the

23

you?
I did.

6

- - - - - - ·--·--·----------·-·· ....... ·-···

1

2

A

............ .

Yes, ma'am.
MS. WITT: I have nothing further,

4

6

··-

preliminary hearing; isn't that correct?

3

5

··•

Your Honor.

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. HOWARD:
Q

I don't know how much you want to belabor this,

7

Officer.

8

where she was during the incident?

You were accurate in saying that you didn't know

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And when you were asked that question at the

11

preliminary hearing and you said I don't know where she was,

12

you were referring to I don't -

I didn't know where she was -

13

A

I didn't know where she was during -

14

Q

- is what you -

15

A

- the incident?

16

Q

So you misspoke?

17

A

Yes.

18

THE COURT: And I have a couple of questions,

19

obviously counsel can followup on.

20

some things.

21

you viewed.

22

not preserved,

23

watched?

24

25

I

and

just want to clarify

So Officer Hansen, tell me how this - whatever
I don't know what word to use.
but you could watch it.

You said i t is

What is it that you

THE WITNESS: It's a digital recording system that
the prison has.

So it's like a DVR.

So it has a 30-day loop
7

1

where the video is stored on a hard drive, and it's

2

continually rewritten.

3

THE COURT: And so how do you view it,

4

to look at it as you say you did,

5

days later, or something?

if you wanted

30 minutes later, or 12

You do it by time and date?

6

THE WITNESS: Time and date, yes.

7

THE COURT: And then you are able to watch i t on a

8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15

~

screen of some sorts?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And how is that made a permanent record
if you wanted to do that?
THE WITNESS: Our investigations department has to
request a copy be burned to a DVD.
THE COURT: So when this event occurred,

I take it

you're required to report to some kind of supervisor?

16

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

17

THE COURT: And did you do that shortly after the

18
19
20

21
22

event, or within a day or two, or something?
THE WITNESS: With - that day, my supervisor knew
what was going on.
THE COURT: And do you fill out an incident report,
or what kind of report are you required to fill out?

23

THE WITNESS: I wrote a report about the incident.

24

THE COURT: And you give it to -

25

THE WITNESS: I turn that into my supervisor.
8

,--:'.).
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THE COURT: And then from there in the system within

2

the Department of Corrections, do you know - is that then, as

3

a matter of course, turned over to someone you call the

4

investigations unit?

5

THE WITNESS: Yes.

6

THE COURT: Or do you know that?

7

THE WITNESS: Depending on the - on what's going on

8

in the report and if you're charging them with something,

9

then it would get turned over to investigations.

10
11

THE COURT: Did - you did - you don't turn i t over
to investigations?

12

THE WITNESS: No.

My supervisor does.

13

THE COURT: And who is that?

14

THE WITNESS: Captain Redding.

15

THE COURT: Captain Redding?

16 '

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative).

17

THE COURT: And do you have any personal knowledge

18

in this case if Captain Redding turned this over to

19

investigations?

20

THE WITNESS: Yes,

she did.

The investigations came

21

and talked to me that aft - up about an hour and a half after

22

the incident.

23

24
25

THE COURT: So that same day,

September 27?

The

same day of the incident, September 27 of last year?
THE WITNESS: Yes,

sir.
9

---·-···-·-·---•--·•·· - - -

1

THE COURT: Okay.

2

THE WITNESS:

3

THE COURT: Do you know who the initial D, as

4

And who was that?
~

I don't recall her name.
in

David, Kemp is?

5

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

6

THE COURT: Kemp, K-E-M-P?

7

THE WITNESS: I believe that was the investigator.

8

What?

I ...

9

THE COURT: And so if - tell me again who could ask

10

for a burned DVD from this digital recording?

11

have?

Could you

12

THE WITNESS: No,

13

THE COURT: And could your supervisor have asked for

14
15

16

sir.

that?
THE WITNESS: My captain could ask for it, or the
Investigations Department could ask.

17

THE COURT: And who do they ask?

18

THE WITNESS: They would request that through our IT

19

Department -

20

THE COURT: Okay.

21

THE WITNESS:

22
23

- and they would send somebody into

pull it from the DVR.
THE COURT: Would your supervisor, and captain,

24

- they would know of this digital recording equipment,

25

the .cameras, and where they're placed, and such?

and

and

10
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1

2

THE WITNESS: They're in the control room so that we
have access to watch a playback,
THE COURT: All right.

3

4

MS. WITT: No, Your Honor.

I think we discussed

this at the last preliminary hearing.

7

THE COURT: Mr. Howard?

8

MR. HOWARD: No,

9

THE COURT: All right.

10

Any followup on any of that?

Ms. Witt?

5
6

if we need to.

Your Honor.
Thank you, Officer Hansen.

You may step down.

11

Any other testimony to present, Ms. Witt?

12

MS. WITT: No, Your Honor.

13

THE COURT: Mr. Howard, any testimony you care to

14
15

16

present?
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, did the Court receive our
supplementary memorandum in this matter?

17

THE COURT: Yes.

18

MR. HOWARD:

19

THE COURT: Filed - yeah.

20

MR. HOWARD:

I sent it in last week.

It's our position that the Court

21

already has sufficient information to rule in favor of the

22

defendant in this case.

23

de minimus, but it is very near to that.

24

a recording did exist.

25

the investigator for the state did not preserve that

The showing that is required is not
We have shown that

We've shown that the investigation -

11
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1

evidence, and that evidence would very likely be exculpable

2

for Ms. Dejesus.

3

that we know of today that has - or claims to have a

4

memory of what was in the video is Officer Hansen, and,

5

course,

6

further evidence is provided by the defendant.

7

deference to the Court in order to provide more information

8

to the Court, we do have two witnesses that we will call.

The only person who has - who saw the video

he's an involved party.

10

suggest you have to.

11

hear,

12

suggesting you need to call -

13

need to call anything.

14 ,

certainly don't know,

15

think I - that might assist me,

However,

I

in

don't

If you have something you want me to

I'll be glad to hear it.

If you don't,

,{'\
~

I'm not

I don't know if you do or don't

I haven't made up my mind yet.
but if you -

So I

if there's some facts you

I'll be glad to hear them.

16

MR. HOWARD: Well,

17

THE COURT: And - but,

18

MR. HOWARD: Obviously,

19

of

So we do not believe any

THE COURT: Well, now let me make it clear.

9

clear

that's you know,

-

I know that the Court can't

order me to put on a witness.

r::,

\$'

20

THE COURT: Right.

21

MR. HOWARD: So I'm aware of that,

but I think that

22

we have, so far,

23

hearing, the Court's indicated that the Court does not

24

believe that there's sufficient information to act positively

25

on our motion.

in our earlier discussions and earlier

So we will call two witnesses that were

12
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1

present at the time,

2

and we'll call first Samantha Dash.

THE COURT: Why don't you step up here in front of

3

my assistant?

4

right hand as best you can, and take an oath, please?

You can halt right there, face her, raise your

SAMANTHA DASH

5

6

Having first been duly sworn, testified

7

upon her oath as follows:

8

THE COURT: Have a seat over here.

9

MS. WITT: And, Your Honor, before Mr. Howard

10

proceeds, the State would request that the Court give a

11

against incrimination warning to Ms. Dash.

12

originally charged in this case, and then those - that charge

13

was dismissed without prejudice.

14

today, we could refile that case, and so I think she needs to

15

be aware of her rights.
THE COURT: Well,

17

anymore than you just did, Ms. Witt.

18

wasn't aware of that.

19

she was charged,

20

have a preliminary hearing or ...

21

She was

So based on her testimony

16

I

right

don't know that I could say
I

will - I

certainly

I hadn't look - researched that.

it was dismissed,

MS. WITT: That's correct.

So

there was - she did not

She did not have a

22

preliminary hearing.

23

had some issues with the witnesses, but if she's testifying

24

today, there is a chance that we would file additional

25

charges or refile those charges.

It was dismissed without prejudice.

We

13
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· THE COURT: Well, Ms. Dash, again I have no

1
2

indication of whether the State will or won't.

3

their decision, but you -

4

that if you say something that is contrary to your interest,

5

it's going to be under oath,

6

State could utilize that if they decide to file charges

7

again.

I guess, you need to understand

MS. DASH: Yes, sir.

9

THE COURT: Okay.
name, and lean forward,
Officer,

11

12

it's on the record, and the

You understand that?

8

10

It's totally

All right.

Go - tell us your

if you would.

if you could pull that microphone down by

her just to make sure it records well.

13

Tell us your name and spell your name?

14

MS. DASH: Samantha Dash, S-A-M-A-N-T-H-A D-A7S-H.

15

THE COURT: Thank you.

16

Mr. Howard?

17

18
19
20

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HOWARD:
Q

Samantha, you're a prisoner at the Utah State

Prison; is that correct?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And we're here today to discuss and investigate an

23

incident that occurred in September of 2013 involving Ms.

24

Dejesus and another inmate with the last name Con.

25

recall that incident?

Do you

14

r

...

1

1

A

I don't want to say nothing.

2

Q

Excuse me?

3

A

I don't want to say nothing.

4

I don't want to

incriminate myself.

5

MR. HOWARD: Very well, thank you.

6

THE COURT: Thank you.

7

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor?

8

THE COURT: You may step down.

9

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, we'll call Sarah Ataata,

10

Thank you.

please?

11

THE COURT: And,

12

this other young lady.

13

here.

14

oath, please?

lady,

just come up here in front of

Do the best you can.

Right over

Raise your right hand as best you can and take an

15

SARAH ATAATA

16

Having first been duly sworn, testified

17

upon her oath as follows:

18

THE COURT: Thank you.

19
20

Come around there and have a

seat, please?
MS. WITT: And,

Your Honor, we would ask for the

21

same admonition be given to this witness.

22

any of our reports.

23

going to be, or how she is even involved with this case,

24

she was not involved in the move.

25

to give her a warning against self incrimination as if she

I - she's not in

I have no idea what her testimony is

and

So we would ask the Court

15
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1

THE COURT: All right.
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First, tell me your name and

spell you name, please?

4

5
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does self incriminate herself, charges could be filed.

2
3

...

MS. ATAATA: Sarah Ataata.

S-A-R-A-H, and my last

name's A-T-A-A-T-A.

6

THE COURT: Say it again?

7

MR. HOWARD: A-T-A -

8

THE COURT: Oh, your last name?

9

MS. ATAATA: A-T-A-A-T-A.

H-E ...

10

THE COURT: Can you say it again?

11

MS. ATAATA: Ataata.

12

THE COURT: Ataata?

13

MS. ATAATA: Yes.

14

THE COURT: All right.

Ms. Ataata,

I have no idea

15

what you're going to talk about, but the State seems to think

16

that potentially you could be the subject of some criminal

17

charge.

18

is to say something that could cause you to be exposed to

19

criminal liability.

20

that.

21

understand· that. You don't have to say anything that could be

22

against you,

You have a right not to incriminate yourself.

That

I have no idea that you will or won't do

They just suggested that's a possibility.

in essence.

You

Do you understand that?

23

MS. ATAATA: Yes.

24

THE COURT: All right.

25

Mr. Howard?

16

-------

1
2
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DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HOWARD:

3

Q

Sarah, you are a prisoner at the Utah State Prison?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And you were present September 27 th ,

6

incident took place between Lissette Dejesus and Inmate Con?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Now,

9

2013 when an

I'm not interested in how that incident began

or how the confrontation between those two inmates occurred

10

or how it proceeded except up to the point where Officer

11

Hansen, who had escorted some inmates to the level at which

12

this occurred,

13

- were you - did you have a vantage point where you were able

14

to observe that occurrence?

forced Ms. Dejesus to the ground.

Were you at

15

A

For the most of it, yes.

16

Q

Did you see the - do you recall a point at which

17

Ms. Dejesus was -

18

MS. WITT: Objection, Your Honor,

19

THE COURT: Overruled.

20

21

Q

(BY MR. HOWARD)

leading.

Do you recall a point at which Ms.

Dejesus was on the ground?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

And what was - where was Officer Hansen at that

24

point?

25

A

They were all on the ground.
17
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1

Q

All three of them were on the ground?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Yes.

4

A

Con - do you guys want me to use -

5

Q

Let me -

6

A

- last names or -

7

Q

Let me guide you a little bit.

~

And what happened thereafter?

Was there a

point

8

at which officer - or Con disengaged and stood back from

9

Dejesus and Officer Hansen?

10

A

No.

11

Q

Was she continually on - behind Officer Hansen to

12

13
14

the side,
A

in front of - can you describe that?
As Officer Hansen was trying to escort Dejesus back

into her room, she was behind him.

15

Q

She meaning?

16

A

Con.

17

Q

Con?

18

And did you see Officer Hansen get Dejesus

into her cell?

19

A

She - yeah.

20

Q

Excuse me?

21

A

I

22

Q

Attempt to?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Was it after that point that they went to the

25

I seen her attempt to.

seen him attempt to.

ground or before that?

18

···----

···-·--···· ..
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1

A

No.

2

Q

Okay.
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It was before that they were on the ground.
And was there any time when Dejesus was on

3

the ground and Hansen was there with her - was there any time

4

when Con backed away several feet?

5

A

No.

6

Q

You're indication is she was right there on his

7

back the whnl~ timp?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

And what was she trying to do?

10

A

Swing.

11

Q

Excuse me?

12

A

Swing.

13

Q

Swing at?

14

A

At over him to get to Dejesus.

15

Q

To try to get to Dejesus?

16

A

Yeah.

17

MR. HOWARD: Okay, thank you.

18

THE COURT: Thank you.

19

Ms. Witt?

20

CROSS EXAMINATION

21

BY MS. WITT:

22

Q

So you said you had a vantage point?

24

A

I was in room 417.

25

Q

And where is this cell located?

23

Where were

you?

Where is it

19

-•~

1

located?

2

A

On the top tier.

3

Q

Okay.

4

So it's on the top tier.

So you were in

your cell?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Is there a wall in between the cells?

7

A

To

8

Q

Yes.

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

So what cell is next to you?

11

A

Sixteen.

12

Q

And then what cell is past that?

13

A

Fifteen.

14

Q

Okay.

separate

And you said that you had - not for the

15

whole part, but you indicated that you had some vantage

16

point?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

And so what was your vantage point?

19

A

Like the incidents that occurred during that time

20

or just what I could see?

21

Q

What you could see?

22

A

You could see up to the tier where -

I don't know

23

how to describe it.

24

- this block right here, my room was right here.

25

see that corner right there and down-all the way over there.

It kind of - like if this were the tier
You could

20

1

Q

So that's how you are saying that you could see

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

And so you watched the entire thing occur?

5

A

The only part I didn't see was when Hansen forced

2

6

this?

Dejesus against the wall to bring her back to her cell.

7

8

So was this the only encounter you've seen between
Hansen - or between - with the defendant?

9

10

A

What do you -

I don't understand what you're

saying.

11

Q

Has the defendant been engaged in other incidents

12

in which Officer Hansen or another officer had to restrain

13

her?

14

MR. HOWARD: Objection, Your Honor.

15

that's beyond the scope of this hearing.

16

THE COURT: Overruled.

17

THE WITNESS: No.

18

19

Q

(BY MS. WITT) So you've never seen any other

incidents between them?

20

A

No.

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

In 417?

23

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

24

A

During that time,

25

I believe

And how long have you been in that cell?

I'd say about a month.

We move

quite often in that building.

21

····-··-···
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1

Q

So what day did you get there?

2

A

In that cell?

3

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

4

A

Gosh,

5

Q

Approximately?

6

A

I

I don't know exactly.

don't know.

I

just remember it was cold outside.

7

So I would say sometime around fall or winter.

8

into the first of the year.

9

Q

Going into the first of what year?

10

A

Last year - this year.

11

Q

A

Q

20

21

Yeah.

I remember the actions that took place.

I

So you don't remember if this was the same date?

You be - but you don't know?

18
19

So what about this incident, that you recall

don't remember exact dates.

16

17

Okay.

this specific incident on this specific day?

14
15

I've been in

that cell twice.

12
13

I don't know.

Maybe going

A

I'm pretty sure I

understand what I see when I

see

Q

But you just said you don't - you're not sure if

it.

you remember the date?

22

A

I don't know exact dates.

23

Q

But you say that you saw this?

24

A

Yeah.

25

Q

But you don't know when it was, and you don't

22

1

recall when you got into the cell?

2

A

No.

3

Q

Who was your roommate or your cell mate?

4

A

Her name is - what's Frog's name?

5

6

9

Her nickname's

Froggy.
Q

7

8

We move quite often in that building.

You don't recall her name?

Not a~ ~nis time.
Q

So when you saw this incident, are they faced

towards you?

10

A

No.

11

Q

So they're - you see them from behind?

12

A

Well,

13

I see them from the side.

Like if I

looking like that.

14

Q

So which direction are they going?

15

A

They moved that way.

16

Q

Did they pass your cell?

17

A

No.

18

It started right in front of my cell and went

that way.

19

Q

They started in front of 417?

20

A

Well,

21

were

it was 416.

It was right next door.

The

doors are adjacent.

22

Q

And which direction were they going?

23

A

To the left.

24

Q

Which is to which - towards which cell?

25

A

It's towards cells 15 and 14, 13.

23

---------~--·-····-·••·•---·-.................... _.____ ._______....._......._. __ ..............".-·····--·"····•·•·"

1

Q

So they started in front of 416?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Where did they come from?

4

A

Con was already on the tier,

5

of the cell.

. ····-·---··••· ..•--"·•····

and Dejesus came out

6

Q

So Con was on the tier?

7

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

8

Q

How was she on the tier?

9

A

She was out on rec.

10

Q

I don't understand what that means?

11

A

Recreation.

12

Q

She was on recreation?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

So she was just hanging out there?

15

A

They were bringing them in from the yard,

16

When you come out -

which at

that time we had to take our rec outside.

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

19

Q

And then she was~ but she was in front of 416?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

No.

23

Q

Okay.

24

·A

25

Q

So there was rec outside?

And she was by herself at that time?
She was with Officer Hansen at that time.
And where did they come from?

Outside.
Okay.

And then where did they go?

Q

24

1

A

They stood in front of 416.

2

Q

And it was just Hansen and -

3

A

Con.

4

Q

- and Con?

5

there?

6

A

Those were the only two that were

Yeah.

7

MS. WITT:

8

THE COURT: Thank you.

9

Mr. Howard, any redirect?

10

MR. HOWARD:

11
12

[inaudible].

BY MR. HOWARD:
Q

Ms. Ataata, do you recall who - at that time,

who

the roommate was for Ms. Dejesus?

15

A

Yeah.

16

Q

And where was she at during this?

17

A

In the room.

18

Q

In the - or in her cell?

19

A

In her cell, yeah.

It was Samantha Dash.

20

THE COURT: Anything else?

21

MR. HOWARD: No.

22

THE COURT: All right.

23

MS. WITT: And just to clarify -

24

THE COURT: Oh, of course.

25

Your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

13
14

I have nothing further,

Ill

25
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1

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

2

BY MS. WITT:

3

Q

Ms. Dash was in her cell the entire time?

4

A

She came in from rec and was in her cell.

5

Q

So she was -

6

A

Are you talking about during the fight?

..,
'

Q

Yeah.

8

A

Yeah, she was in her cell.
MS. WITT: Okay, thank you.

9

10
11

THE COURT: All right.

You may step down.

Thank

you.

12

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh {affirmative).

13

MS. WITT: Oh, Your Honor,

can we recall her for
C;

~

14

just a moment?

15

going to testify.

16

17

We weren't aware that she was

So I apologize.

THE COURT: Come on back,
right.

18

if you would then?

All

You're still under oath.
Go ahead, Ms. Witt.

19

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION (resumed)

20

BY MS. WITT:

21

Q

22

I'm sorry.

And just really quick, what is your relationship

with the defendant?

23

A

My fiance.

24

Q

So you have a very close relationship with her?

25

A

Yeah.

26
!.._...... .
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I

1

MS. WITT: Thank you.

2

THE COURT: Mr. Howard?

3

MR. HOWARD: Nothing, Your Honor.

4

THE COURT: All right,

5

thank you.

Mr. Howard, any further testimony you care to
present?

8

MR. HOWARD: No, Your Honor.

9

THE

10

You may step

down.

6
7

l

I have nothing further.

COURT: Ms. Witt, any further testimony from the

State?

11

MS. WITT: No, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

Well,

I'll be glad to hear

13

arguments.

14

and I'll probably issue a written ruling, but - and think

15

about further,

16

further argument, Mr. Howard.

17

your memos.

18

anything else you want to say, go ahead,

19

from the State.

20

I'm going to have to take this under advisement,

but I'll be glad to hear any argument -

I've read them.

MR. HOWARD: Well,

Again, you're right.
I'll read them again,

any

I've got

but

and then I ' l l hear

just briefly, Your Honor.

Some

21

of the facts are fairly well established.

An incident took

22

place.

if you will,

23

between Ms. Dejesus and Ms. Con.

24

He claims he was kicked.

25

hearing, we're not even disputing that, but his testimony at

There was a struggle of - a fight,

Officer Hansen intervened.

And for the purposes of this

27

1

the preliminary hearing was mixed.

2

he - she was five to six feet behind him, but he admitted on

3

cross examination he didn't know where she was.

4

wants to change that testimony to mean "I didn't know where

5

she was at that time."

6

of the preliminary hearing,

7

i•Jhere she was.

8
9

He said at one time that

Now,

he

But we were talking about at the time
she said - he said,

I don't know

The only other officers who have - that I know of
that viewed the recording don't have a clear recollection of

10

the incident that's well over a year ago now.

11

perhaps stick out in their mind as well as it might of those

12

that were closely involved in it.

13

It doesn't

Ms. Dash, of course, was wise enough to pick up on

14

a no subtle threat today that she might could possibly be

15

prosecuted if she were to testify, and Ms. Ataata did

16

testify.

17

was on the ground and Hansen was there with her, that inmate

18

Con was right there the whole time swinging at Dejesus.

19

She indicated that at that time that Ms. Dejesus

We believe, Your Honor,

that that having been

20

caught on video recording would have been sufficient to

21

present to a jury and leave to their decision, of course, but

22

we believe it would have shown that Ms. Dejesus was in the

23

proces.s of trying to protect herself from the continued

24

attack of Ms. Con.

25

appalling situation,

It is, from our point of view, an
that an hour and a half after the
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1

incident an investigator spoke to Officer Hansen, and the

2

State failed in their responsibility to preserve that

3

evidence.

4

maliciously destroyed, or as a matter of routine, ·err a

5

of judgment, or mere incompetence.

6

State had possession of the evidence, and they are required

7

to preserve it.

8

it, the Court should dismiss this case against Ms. Dejesus.

9

We're not arguing here as to whether it was

I

And, therefore,

might - if I

10

THE COURT: Sure.

11

MR. HOWARD:

lapse

All we know is that the

since they didn't preserve

-

I might just add one thing, Your Honor.

12

This kind of situation presents a horrifying precedent

13

wherein the State can - through negligence allow evidence to

14

be dismissed, but also provides an avenue - and I'm not

15

saying that's what's happened here.

16

which they can destroy evidence which is favorable to the

17

· defendant.

It provides an avenue by

Officer Hansen is not an objective observer just

18

cause he was there at the scene.

He's involve - he was

19

involved in the incident, and he has already said, at least

20

at one point,

I don't know where Con was.

21

THE COURT: Thank you.

22

Ms. Witt?

23

MS. WITT: Yes, Your Honor.

The State received the

24

defense counsel's supplemental filing yesterday afternoon.

25

Because of the holidays,

I think it was filed late Wednesday
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So we -

2

THE COURT: Yes.

3

MS. WITT: - didn't receive it -

4

THE COURT: Yeah.

5

MS. WITT: - late in the afternoon.

@

So I didn't

6

have the time - that much time to look over it.

However,

7

Your Honor, we have heard the testimony of Officer Hansen,

8

who.was present at the time.

9

hearing transcript, his testimony is clear.

If you look at the preliminary
On page 3 he was

10

asked,

"How far away - when you pushed her to the floor,

11

where was Con after you pushed Dejesus to the floor?"

12

testified Con was behind me a few feet,

13

"A few feet behind you?"

14

Now,

And he said,

And he

and I clarified that.
"Yes, ma' am."

I think he was trying to characterize,

and I

15

think he did a very good job of characterizing the testimony

16

that Mr. Howard has been referring to as far as being -

17

being on the back.

18

Honor looks to those pages within the preliminary hearing,

19

you'll see that defense counsel specifically asking questions

20

about what he's observing as this event is occurring,

21

that's what.Officer Hansen testified to today.

22

he was answering the question, because all the questions,

23

you look at the transcript, that defense counsel was posing

24

at that time had to do with his observations at the time it

25

was occurring, and I think that's commendable that the

her

At the time of the testimony if Your

and

That he was if

30
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1

officer wasn't combining, you know, what he learned later

2

with what was occurring at that time.

3

there's any change in his testimony.

4

actually stated she was a few feet behind.

So I don't think
Like I said, page 60 he

Today, Mr. - Officer Hansen testified that he did

5

6

view the playback on the DVR.

7

playback, he could see how far she was behind him, and

8

that's,

9

she was a few feet behind.

That when he viewed the

I believe, what led to his testimony on page six that
He had the opportunity to view

10

that playback.

11

They appeared today.

12

spoke with that officer and declined to call that officer,

13

because that officer could not bring forth any additional

14

evidence.

15

made a tentative ruling that you were inclined, kind of,

16

deny, but you wanted more evidence as to what was on the

17

video, and you asked defense counsel to find other witnesses

18

who actually viewed the video.

19

Officer Hansen here.

20

officer who saw the video or the playback, and I don't mean

21

to say video.

Mr. Howard has subpoenaed the other officer.
One of the officers appeared today.

He

When we were here for the last hearing, this Court
to

So that's why we brought

That's why defense subpoenaed the other

I really mean to say playback.

22

THE COURT: Right.

23

MS. WITT: And Mr. Hansen did testify as to what he

24

saw on the playback, and that corresponds with his testimony.

25

I think that's - I think that's very accurate testimony.
31
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Defense counsel has brought the defendant's fiance to

1
2

speak today,

and she's not been involved in this case

3

whatsoever.

She didn't - there's nothing in the report where

4

she said anything to officers whatsoever about what happened.

5

I think the defense - I mean, Officer Hansen was really clear

6

about what he saw on that video, and I think based on that

7

that there is no reasonable probability.

8

defense has shown that there's a reasonable probability that

9

there's any exculpatory evidence that was on any possible

10

I don't think

video.

11

The other thing that the court - that the State

12

would like to point out is that there was no video made.

13

This·is a DVR playback, and unless someone says, Hey,

14

a copy of this, a copy does not get made.

15

counsel's supplemental brief, he actually started parsing

16

words saying because we didn't say that there was a video

17

that was destroyed in our response to the supplementary

18

request for discovery,

19

destruction just because we didn't say, Oh, well, we also

20

found out that it was destroyed.

21

time.

22

We asked the prison, do you have a copy of the surveillance

23

video.

24

we give to defense counsel.

25

we need

In defense

that we were culpable in that

We didn't know at that

We - they asked for a copy of a surveillance video.

They said no.

There isn't one.

That's the response

Now, this case - this event occurred on September
32
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2

Attorneys Office until January.

3

4

-- - • - •..• ···--·---· I

However, this case did not even come to the District

THE COURT: It was filed January 14.

So it was shy

a few days -

5

MS. WITT: Correct.

6

THE COURT: A month.

7

MS. WITT: So Lhere l.s no -

8

THE COURT: Four months.

9

MS. WITT: That's correct.

10

---···---·····

So there is no way the

State could have gotten this -

11

THE COURT: So let me interrupt.

So I don't need to

12

worry about why that is?

13

saying I don't even look at good faith,

14

negligence, anything else, because they haven't shown there's

15

a reasonable probability it contains exculpatory evidence?

16

So - I mean, precisely, you're

MS. WITT: Well,

bad faith,

I think your showing first has to

17

be that there's a reasonable probability.

18

reasonable probability that there's exculpatory evidence,

19

then we can look at whether or not the destruction was

20

wilful, or was it - there was bad faith, or was there

21

anything malicious that was done for the destruction of this.

22

This is - was a routine recording over a DVR recording that's

23

on a hard drive.

24

we -

25

Then if there's a

It's not ·like we had a physical video,

and

THE COURT: Right.
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1

MS. WITT: - destroyed it, or we lost it.

2

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, though.

I mean,

3

again I'm not hinting by any of these questions.

I don't

4

know how I'm going to rule.

5

an investigator, knowing that an officer says I just got

6

a~saulted - kicked - it's on this thing up in the sky.

7

conceivable reason would that person have for not saying

8

let's burn a DVD?

9

MS. WITT: Well,

It -

I really don't, but why wouldn't
C\

•
What

if they don't - if they are not

10

anticipating filing charges - if they are anticipating on

11

dealing with it within the confines of the prison system,

12

don't think that they would do that, and that's the only

13

thing I can assume is the reason why there was such a delay

14

in filing the charges.

15

victim, Con, as far as whether or not they were going to file

16

charges against Con, and Con, who was also assaulted by the

17

defendant - there was some investigation, some discussion

18

with her about whether or not she wanted to file charges or

19

have charges filed on her· behalf because of what the

20

defendant did.

21

could have been something that was internal, but there

22

certainly isn't something where we take a - we tell the

23

prison never, never,

I

I know there was some issue with the

That could have delayed the process,

and it

never record things.

24

THE COURT: Well, -

25

MS. WITT:

I think they 34

1

THE COURT:

2

MS. WITT: - have their own guidance on when to do

3

- okay.

that.
THE COURT: Well, and let me - so let me - yeah.

4

I

5

mean, what I want to get at in my mind - it may be totally

6

irrelevant.

7

and study the law further,

8

suggesting - I just have to guess what's happened afterwards,

9

right?

I don't know yet.

I've got to think it through

but I mean, you're really

I mean, because, you know,

from a standpoint of just

10

common sense it would seem, Okay,

11

assaulted by an inmate,

12

childish way to put it, but - and then you tell the -

13

know, someone - the supervisor, and the supervisor says to

14

himself or herself, Well,

15

Let's take a look at it, and then why don't we keep it?

16

then it sits around for three or four months, and a charge is

17

filed.

18

I've heard no direct testimony.

19

said it just goes over and keeps running,

20

sayin~ I should disregard that.

21

beca~se I can't,

22

that's good faith,

23

what the standard I'm going to have to come up with,

24

wouldn't know there was a charge filed?

25

The investigators investigated it seemingly immediately.

I'm an officer.

I

got

I'm going to tell - that's kind of a
you

I know there's a recording of that.

And certainly - it certainly - understand -

And

although,

Officer Hansen basically

I

but you're really

just have to guess,

for the life of me - I mean, how can you say
or not negligence, or - again I don't know
but who

I don't understand.
He
35
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1

talked to Officer Hansen that day,

2

some sense of I believe him, or I don't,

3

up, he's a lousy officer, we never believe anything he says,

4

or we're - yeah, you know,

5

they're kind of making a decision themselves - what they're

6

going to do, and all sorts of things can come and interfere

7

with whether they get to the DA's Office and whether i t ' s

8

done the next day,

9

sure lots of things can happen, but I

10

I

-

I

and so they would have had

mean,

or he's making it

they're going to -

or the next week, or the next month.

I'm

just have to guess on

all that, right?

Q
11
12

MS. WITT: No, Your Honor.

Actually, he testified

that they viewed the video - they viewed the playback.

13 .

THE COURT: Right.

14

MS. WITT: So there were people who viewed the

15

playback.

16

THE COURT: Right.

17

MS. WITT: So the assumption would be that they

18

didn't feel that it was necessary, because it corresponded

19

with what happened and what the test - and what the officers,

20

who were present, saw that day.

21

another officer who actually viewed the video who was here

22

today who stated they couldn't remembered specifically how

23

far Con was away, but she did recall the events as they

24

occurred, and that was as was placed in the reports.

25

the first hurdle,

And like I said, defense had

I

think

however, is whether or not there's any

36

1

exculpable - reasonable probability that there's exculpable

2

material on -

3

THE COURT: I understand.

4

MS. WITT: - this.

5

THE COURT: Right.

6

claiming the hurdle is,

7

they're over it,

8

past that, you lose, right?

9

good faith,

I understand that's what you're

but let's assume for a moment that

and I'm just - then you lose.

I mean, you haven't demonstrated

have you?

10

MS. WITT: I think we have, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT: Tell me how.

12

MS. WITT:

13

I think as soon as the case was filed, we

knew -

14
15

If they get

THE COURT: Well, between then then.

four months between

The four months between September -

16

MS. WITT: We, the State,

itself had no knowledge

17

that this case was ongoing, that anything had occurred until

18

it had been presented to our office.

19

THE COURT: Certainly.

20

MS. WITT:

21

It was not presented to our office until

January.

22

THE COURT: I understand.

23

MS. WITT: The moment - within two - I think two

24

weeks, defense counsel requested a copy, and we started the

25

process to see 37
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1

THE CdURT: I urtderstand.

2

MS. WITT: - if there was a video.

3

THE COURT: Yeah,

but I'm talking about the -

yeah.

4

The time - the prison between the time of this event and when

5

the DA,

your office, got it.
MS. WITT:

6

Is there any - tell me how you-

I don't see there's any show of bad

They routinely let - and I think he testified that if

7

faith.

8

- they just routinely copy over.

9

- if we're trying to find out what their decision was for

Now, what they're decision

10

charging this, then we would need to bring in that

11

investigator.

12

we didn't -

That's not what this Court requested,

13

THE COURT: We 11,

14

MS. WITT: - subpoena the investigator.

and so

The Court

15

simply asked defense counsel to find other people to view the

16

video so that they could come and testify what they saw on

17

the video to make a determination of whether it was

18

exculpatory.

19

MR. HOWARD: I don't think that's an accurate -

20

MS. WITT: - and that's -

21

MR. HOWARD: -

22

MS. WITT:

23

MR. HOWARD: The Court asked me to - the court

Q

statement, Your Honor.

I think that is.

I mean,

-

24

indicated to me that it needed more information.

It didn't

25

specifically indicate call persons who have seen the tape.

38
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1

I

And if I might add?

When the state now is referring to

2

when we got the case, that happened no later than an hour and

3

a half after the incident,

4

the investi9ator.

5

DA's Office has -

6
7

because we, the State,

includes

I'm not suggesting that Ms. Witt or the

THE COURT: Well,

it's abundantly clear that,

yeah,

that they didn't have anythj.ng to rln with this-

8

MR. HOWARD: Yeah, but -

9

THE COURT: Meaning the DA's Office.

10

MR. HOWARD: - we, the State, -

11

MS. WITT: Correct.

12

THE COURT: Yeah -

13

MR. HOWARD: - started with -

14

THE COURT: There's no question about

15

MR. HOWARD: - the investigator.

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. WITT: But also,

- that.

None whatsoever.
Your Honor,

it's an hour and a

18

half after this occurred they started investigating i t .

19

didn't come to a conclusion.

20

Hey, at that moment they decided they were going to file

21

charges.

There's nothing to say that,

22

THE COURT: Right.

23

MS. WITT: They didn't - they were continuing an

24

investigation.

25

~hat's when they -

They

So however long that investigation took,
I guess,

they decided to file it with us.

39

1

THE COURT: Right.

2

MS. WITT:

I don't have the investigator.

I did not

3

subpoena the investigator to find out why it took so long,

4

· because - and it is my understanding from what I recall and

5

from the notes that I took at the ·1ast hearing that the Court

6

was looking for additional - an additional evidentiary

7

hearing to determine what was on the video.
THE COURT: Well,

8
9

I do not remember specifically -

the minute entry says the Court will allow additional time

10

for defense to submit further proof of why case was not filed

11

until January and show further testimony or affidavit why

12

surveillance video was not retained based on the alleged

13

assault.

14

all those folks today.

15

yeah, you know,

16

I didn't -

17

evidently it was that very day, and I didn't keep that -

18

a - I didn't know it worked, but now,

19

bit.

20

I didn't go to the DA until this point in time, and these are

21

the reasons.

22

So, you know,

I sort of thought I'd be hearing from
That is, the investigator saying

I talked to him a week later, a month later.

I had no idea what he'd say, but it turns out

I guess,

I do a

burn

little

So I didn't burn a DVD, and these are the reasons,

MS. WITT: And I think,

and

Your Honor, that was the

23

confusion, because you put that bu~den on the defense counsel

24

to bring someone in to find out why.

25

hearing was for the sole purpose of the defense to do some

..

This second evidentiary

40
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1

followup.

The State was not requested to find - get the

2

investigator here, and I don't even know if Mr. Howard spoke

3

to the investigator in this case.

4

and spoke to another officer who viewed the video - the

5

playback.
THE COURT: Well,

6

I do know he subpoenaed

I think -

I certainly don't mean

.I

to imply that I now am clear who has what burden, but I

8

really - I genuinely -

9

follow the law and I -

I want to get it right.

10

MS. WITT: Well,

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. WITT: And, Your Honor,

-

I want to

in order to -

I am interested in those other facts.
in light of the fact

13

that the defense filed their supplemental motion the day

14

before Thanksgiving and we only received it yesterday,

15

State would ask for time to respond to that, and the State

16

will get an affidavit from the investigator to explain the

17

procedure or the events as they occurred.
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor,

18

I fear the state -

the

with all

19

respect, because I have considerable admiration for Ms.

20

but the state seems to be missing the point.

21

why it took so long.

22

it.

23

makes is not logical; that the incident happened,

24

viewed it, and they saw, oh, this video supports our side of

25

the story.

Witt,

We don't care

We don't care why they didn't preserve

They didn't preserve it.

The argument that Ms.

We don't need to keep it.

Witt

officers

That's contrary to

41
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logic.
THE COURT: I'm not saying it's illogical, but I am

2
3

...

saying

4

MR. HOWARD: It would be -

5

THE COURT: I am somewhat agreeing with Mr.

6

I mean,

7

interested in why it wasn't preserved.

8

I don't know.

9

okay, we've got this woman now.

You may be right, Ms. Witt.

Howard.

Here it is -

I

am

Whether I should be,

That I may eventually

10

conclude they haven't shown any viable basis to believe that

11

it had something on there,

12

yet.

13

in that issue of why it was not retained.

14

want to know that,

15

I know everybody's tired of hearing this, but I - you know, I

16

can make a decision easy.

17

I mean,

18

best I can.

I'd like to hear from that officer who

19

eventually -

I agree.

20

took three months, but it might be important to know why it

21

wasn't done the next day,

22

When - you know,

23

didn't probably get it clear from Officer Hansen when it's

2.4

recorded over or whether it's 12 days, or 17, or 31.

But

25

whatever the routine is, why it wasn't kept - I mean,

just

if I conclude that.

I don't know what I'm going to do,

I don't know

but I am interested
I mean,

inter - I

and I think rather than an affidavit - and

Yeah,

I want to get it right.

you lose.

You - you know, -

I want to know the facts as

It's not necessarily important why it

or the day after, or something.

I don't know what he's going to say,

and I

42

1

again from a common sense standpoint,

2

everything isn't kept for~ver.

3

- something of interest with possible criminal charges,

4

- ·I'm at a loss to just see and guess why that investigator

5

would say, oh, we don't need that.

6

yeah, that's like saying, well, the officer saw it, so we can

7

- we don't need to have a video cameia in his car, because -

8

we'll just throw it away, cause he said he stopped him for

9

speeding or whatever.

10

continue this.

Yeah.

I understand why

But, you know, if there was a

So I

mean, that's -

I

-

I

I

I am

mean,

mean, I want to

I -

MS. WITT: And the State will be happy to subpoena

11

12

the investigator, and the investigator was Officer Debbie

13

Kemp.

14

THE COURT: And find out why it wasn't retained,

and

15

maybe some other things.

16

at the risk of driving the prison nuts and everybody nuts in

17

coming back and forth,

18

All right.

I'll think about it more, but - so

I think I want to do that.
Can you all do that?

So . . .

Do you think you

19

can get her - she's still there as far as you know?

20

get her back here in a couple of weeks?

You can

21

MS. WITT: She's there.

22

THE COURT: Does anyone know if she's still there?

23

MS. WITT: Yeah.

He believes she's still working

24

there, and I believe I've talked to her like a couple of

25

months ago in another case.

If we have any difficulty in

43

'

I

1

s~bpoen~ing her, we will certainly let Mr. Howard and the

2

Court know.

3

4
5

6
7

8

9

THE COURT: Two weeks?

Does that work for everyone?

The 16 th ?
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor,

I have that - that

afternoon's very full for me.
THE COURT: Me too.

The 18 th isn't much better,

but:

it's - the 18 th ?
MR. HOWARD: The 18 th would be better for me.

10

THE COURT: Okay.

11

MS. WITT: I have no objections to the 18 th

12

THE COURT: All right, Thursday, the 18 th at 1:00.

13

I'd like to hear - whoever brings them of what transpired

14

from the time of the invest - whoever made decisions.

15

Whether it was a captain, whether it was the investigators

16

divisions - whatever they're called, when they were made

17

aware that Officer Hansen alleged an assault against an

18

inmate, what was the process?

19

20
21
22
23

•

MS. WITT: I will have Officer Kemp and any other
officials that we need to have present at that hearing.
THE COURT: All right.

December 18t\ we' 11 continue

this for further evidence, and see you then.

Thank you all.

(~hereupon the hearing was concluded)

24
25

(5-18-15}

Q
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1

WEST JORDAN, UTAH - JANUARY 15, 2015

2

JUDGE BRUCE LUBECK

3

(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT: State versus Dejesus, 141400093.

7

Tl-•-----l
nuwaLu.

This is a continuation of a hear in<J

8

we'd had a couple of times.

9

unable to appear.

10

We put it over until today.

MS. WITT: Your Honor,

Where are we

Debbie Kemp is present today

and is prepared to testify.

13
14

The last time a witness was

now?

11

12

She's

THE COURT: Okay.

Let's go ahead and conclude that

evidence.

15

MS. WITT: The State would call Debbie Kemp.

16

THE COURT: Step up here in front of my assistant,

17

and raise your right hand, and take an oath, please?

18

DEBBIE KEMP

19

Having first been duly sworn, testified

20

upon her oath as follows:

21

THE COURT: Have a seat up here.

22

And tell us your

name and spell your name.

23

THE WITNESS: Debbie, D-E-B-B-I-E; Kemp, K-E-M-P.

24

THE COURT: It's D-E-B-B-I-E, you said?

25

THE WITNESS: Yes, uh-huh (affirmative).
1

1

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

2

Ms. Witt?

3

MS. WITT: Yes.

4
5

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. WITT:

6

Q

Could you tell who you're currently employed with?

7

A

The Department of Corrections.

8

Q

And were you employed with the Department of

9

Corrections in September - on September 27 th of 2013?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And in your employment at that time, what were your

12
13

duties?
A

I am part of the Law Enforcement Bureau, and our

14

duties are to investigate any criminal matter; state,

15

in the prison system and outside.

16

Q

federal

And was there an incident that occurred on
(~,

17

September 27 th involving the defendant?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And were you the - were you assigned as the

20

investigator on that case?

21

A

I was the on-call investigator.

22

Q

Okay.

So you - could you talk a little bit about

23

what the policy is as far as playbacks of recordings made in

24

the prison through the camera system?

25

w

Was that Dejesus?

A

There is no policy.

2

Okay.

1

Q

2

did you do?

3

A

So when you were asked to investigate,

what

I responded to Timp 3 where I was shown where the

4

incident occurred, and then I interviewed those involved.

5

Officer Hansen,

6

that time.

7

at the officer's station.

8

officer's station at the beginning and asked if there was a

9

recording.

I interviewed later, cause he wasn't in at

And then at the conclusion of that,

Well, actually I stopped in the

And they said, yeah, they had reviewed it,

10

then I went about doing my interviews.

11

my way out,

12

Q

13

I stopped in

and

And when I stopped on

I asked them to get me a copy of that.

So when you say that there was a recording,

that's

just a playback?

14

A

It's a playback -

15

Q

That's not a -

16

A

- uh-huh (affirmative).

17

Q

That's not actually physically downloaded?

18

A

No.

19

Q

Okay.

20

A

Yes,

21

Q

- for that?

And so you did make a request I did.
Was there anything unusually happening

22

- unusual happening within in your department within this

23

time frame?

24

A

25

There was.

Our director passed our bureau with

conducting all background investigation on new officer

3

1

applicants.

2

Q

3

4

And because of that, what - were your duties

changed or were you A

Yeah.

Many things were put on the back burner.

5

were each assigned 10 applicants to do a background

6

investigation on to be completed in three weeks where the

7

avcLa~=

8

having eight weeks.

9

just to get caught up and,

10
11

Q

We

would be where we're at now at doing four to five and
That went on for three or four months
you know, with all the applicants.

And did all this additional work assignments -

this

12

A

It did -

13

Q

-

14

A

It did.

15

Q

Okay.

with the District Attorneys Office?

Did this also delay your followup

16

investigations as far as requesting additional information

17

about where or if anything had been downloaded on the video?

18

A

Yes,

it did.

19

MS. WITT:

20

THE COURT: Mr. Howard?

21

MR. HOWARD: No questions,

22

THE COURT: Well,

23

24
25

Q

- did this delay the· actual filing of the case -

I have nothing further,

Your Honor.

Your Honor.

I have some, and then you can

followup on it.
So is it Agent Kemp?
is capturing images,

Ms. Kemp,

so when this device

it stores them - let's say it captured
4

,---·---. ---I
1

1

an image and the machine was then turned off.

2

be there?

3

It would still

THE WITNESS: It - my understanding is is ~t remains

4

there for 30 days.

5

THE COURT: And what happens after 30 days?

6

THE WITNESS: It's gone.

.,I

what I've been told .

8

THE COURT:

As far as I know,

that's

Does someone have to do anything to

make it disappear?

9

10

THE WITNESS: I don't know.

11

I

wouldn't think so,

no.

12

THE COURT: So did you ever view an image of this

13

alleged event on - allegedly happened September 27 th ?

14

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

When I initially went in,

it

15

was to ask if there was video of the incident and to review

16

it.

17

was new.

18

able to, but they mentioned that they had reviewed i t .

The officer that was in there at the time didn't -

19

She didn't have a

[inaudible] camera.

So I

she

wasn't

THE COURT: They meaning someone in that control
unit?

20

21

THE WITNESS:

22

THE COURT: But in that control unit?

23

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative), yes.

24

THE COURT: And so you can view it from in there?

25

I

I'm sure the officers involved.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
5

i····-···-- •-•--- ~· .. ·- .

·-•-•·•-···-"""''"''"

1

--- ........................ ..

THE COURT: And if someone's - you said you asked

2

someone to make a copy.

3

well in that -

Where is that done?

4

THE WITNESS: Yes.

5

THE COURT:

6

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative).

7

THE COURT: And who did you

8

THE WITNESS: You know,

9

In there as

- control unit?

,
asK

.

1:.0

,

ao

I don't have that officer's

name.

10

THE COURT: But in any event, you never got one?

11

THE WITNESS: I never got one.

12

THE COURT: Did you follow up?

13

THE WITNESS:

I did, but it - time had passed by the

14

time I got back to,

15

duties,

16

several people over there to get - to find out where the copy

17

was, and they said you probably need to get a hold of Captain

18

Maryann Redding, which I did.

19

and she said after 30 days,

20

was a copy made - if.- she said, then it's been misplaced,

21

cause they've looked for it.

you know, being back to my regular

and that's when I contacted -

I probably talked to

We exchanged several emails,

it goes off the camera.

If there

So she had never seen the copy.

22

THE COURT: So by copy, you mean it's burned on -

23

THE WITNESS: Burned -

24
25

·THE COURT:

- to a disk?

THE WITNESS: - and downloaded, yes.

~--,
\:ij;,'

6

1

THE COURT: And so this 30 day thing, you don't now

2

if that's a decisional process made after 30 days or the

3

machine just makes it evaporate, so to speak?

4

know?

5

THE WITNESS: No, because I don't have the privilege

6

of downloading anything like that.

7

know is what I've been told,

8

comes off.

9

10

~nrl

So I don't know.

that

it

-

All I

after 30 days,

it?

Just people that work in that control unit?
THE WITNESS: Typically,

it's the captain -

a

lieutenant-captain.

13

THE COURT: And so you went back after October 2 T~1-?

14

You don't know - do you know when about to try to get that

15

copy?

16

17

it

THE COURT: Who has that privilege of downloading

11

12

You don't

THE WITNESS:

It was probably even past that time,

'cause we were still doing the background investigations.

18

THE COURT: So again you're not sure if it's -

19

THE WITNESS: But after - yeah.

20

that would have been gone.

21

THE COURT: Right.

After October 27th,

And again you're not sure if

22

that happens by someone making a decision to engage some

23

mechanism to make it disappear or if it just begins at that

24

point to record over -

25

THE WITNESS: That's what 7
I

- t

···-·····- .. --··---·--· ·----···•-"--·····-· ..

.,,_,.,,

............. .

1

THE COURT:

2

THE WITNESS: That's my -understanding.

- so to speak?
That there's

3

not one person that takes it off, but it records over after

4

30 days.

5

THE COURT: Give me just a sec.

And so - so the

person you asked to make a recording, you don't know who that

6
7

8

THE WITNESS: I couldn't - no.
officers over there.

9

I would not, and I don't work directly

10

inside the prison.

11

of them.

12

to ask for it, and I always get it.

13

I - there's so many

So I don't have that familiarity with all

I can say that that's a standard for me to do and
So ...

THE COURT: So when you went back to look for

it,
r:-,

14
15

vtJJ

who did you go to?
1

THE WITNESS:

I

just called over and talked to

16

several officers.

17

names, but I can tell you that I was referred to talk to

18

Captain Maryann Redding, and it would have been her or maybe

19

the lieutenant that would have made that copy.

20

THE COURT: Any followup from anyone?

21

MS. WITT: No, Your Honor.

22

MR. HOWARD: I think I'll ask just a few questions,

23

I can't give you their

Your Honor.
CROSS EXAMINATION

24

25

Again, you know,

BY MR. HOWARD:
8

G

1

Q

Ms. - is it detective or ...

2

A

Investigator.

3

Q

Investigator

4

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

5

Q

-

Kemp,

-

I'm going to ask you some questions you

6

probably- don't know the answer to;

8

doesn't record it onto a ~ideotape, does it?

9
10

A

but this camera system

I couldn't really even answer that for sure.

don't think so,

I

no.

11

Q

Rather,

12

A

I would think so,

13

Q

And that image is stored in the system's computer?

14

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

15

Q

And for whatever reason,

16
17

it records it - it keeps a digital image?
yeah.

the system is set to

delete after 30 days?
A

Yeah.

Q

But the system, unless it's run by an old 286

Delete,

record over.

It's just - i t ' s gone.

18

19
20

computer, has plenty of room - it could store it longer?

21

Okay, thank you.

22
23

24
25

A

Yeah,

I don't know.

MR. HOWARD:

I didn't expect you'd know all those

answers there.
THE COURT: Anything else?
9

1

MS. WITT: No, Your Honor.

2

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

3

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative).

4

THE COURT: Ms. Kemp, you may step down.

5

Well,

6

get Captain Redding in here.

7

8

I'm kidding.

Any other evidence anyone wants to

All right.
present on the matter?

9

MS. WITT: No, Your Honor.

10
11

I think we should take another two weeks and

The State will submit.

MR. HOWARD: Was the Court being facetious there, or
Q

are we looking -

12

THE COURT: Yes -

13

MR. HOWARD: - for two weeks?

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. HOWARD: Oh, okay.

16

THE COURT: We've continued it about four times to

- I was.

17

get additional evidence, but no,

18

I'm going to continue it.

19

going to write a written opinion.

20

It's a difficult issue.

21

and such.

22

under advisement.

23

I think I will schedule another hearing, but not - and you'll

24

have it in writing what I've decided by then, and then we'll

25

just go from whatever I decide.

I'm not facetious in saying

I want to study this further.

I'm

It's an interesting issue.

So - and you've submitted your memos

So I think I'm well advised.

I'm going to take it

I'm going to issue a written opinion.

So

We'll either - I guess,
10

G

r······· . ·· ··••·••· -······-············---···-•·-••······ ··••···········--·······•·••·••--·- ······· .................... -·· ..... -·- ········....···••-•·---·-·••·• ···•-·••·· -- -····-· ·•·--·· -··- •·• ........ ····-···
I

1

let~s see.

2

deny it, then we'll just set a trial,

I guess, the options are I'll dismiss it,
I guess.

3

MS. WITT: Correct, Your Honor.

4

THE COURT: That's where we are?

5

and I ' l l have that .days.

6

or if I

Right?

Yeah, okay.

So

I ' l l get it done in the next several

So let's just go out two weeks, and again I won't -

7

we'll just either again set

8

matter's going to be dismissed then or we'll set a trial.

9

let's have you back, Ms. Dejesus, on the 29 th at 1:30,

10

say that the

So

and I

will have an opinion done by then.

11

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor,

12

is - no, that should be

fine.

13

THE COURT: Okay.

14

All right,

thank you.

See you

then.

15

MR. HOWARD: Thank you.

16

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded}

17

18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25

(5-1 7-15)
11
l
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